Abstract: Jurisprudential accounts of the autonomy of EU law have struggled to offer a compelling account of its unique features. Nevertheless, I argue that Ronald Dworkin’s court-centric methodological approach is better-suited than Hartian positivism to shed light on the notion that EU law is autonomous. This is because most questions about the...
Abstract: Jurisprudential accounts of the autonomy of EU law have struggled to offer a compelling account of its unique features. Nevertheless, I argue that Ronald Dworkin’s court-centric methodological approach is better-suited than Hartian positivism to shed light on the notion that EU law is autonomous. This is because most questions about the...
Table of Contents: I. Introduction. – II. Actants. – III. The absence of brute facts. – IV. Valency. – V. Law as proliferation of power. – VI. Increasing adjudicative power. – VII. Increasing regulatory power. – VIII. Conclusion: the importance of inclusion and empowerment.
Abstract: Two...
Table of Contents: I. The autonomy of EU law and legal theory: bridging the disconnect. – II. Overview of this Special Section.
Abstract: The autonomy of EU law is a source of ample connections between EU law and legal theory. This Special Section contributes to the mutual...
Table of Contents: I. Introduction. – II. Actants. – III. The absence of brute facts. – IV. Valency. – V. Law as proliferation of power. – VI. Increasing adjudicative power. – VII. Increasing regulatory power. – VIII. Conclusion: the importance of inclusion and empowerment.
Abstract: Two...
Table of Contents: I. Introduction. – II. Autonomy in the early theories of sovereignty. – III. A historical hypothesis: autonomy as an institutional tool. – IV. The triumph of autonomy. – V. A change of paradigm: absolute autonomy v offene Staatlichkeit. – VI. Reverse autonomy. – VII. Autonomy of the EU vis-à-vis its Member States...
Table of Contents: I. Introduction. – II. Defiance. – III. Primacy of what? – IV. Pluralism in action. – V. The incoherence of pluralism. – V.1. Legal systems do not “conflict”. – V.2. Legal systems do not “overlap”. – V.3. Pluralism cannot provide a framework for consensus. – VI. Federal monism. – VII. Social monism. – VIII. Primacy: a pragmatic...
Table of Contents: I. Introduction. – II. Autonomy in the early theories of sovereignty. – III. A historical hypothesis: autonomy as an institutional tool. – IV. The triumph of autonomy. – V. A change of paradigm: absolute autonomy v offene Staatlichkeit. – VI. Reverse autonomy. – VII. Autonomy of the EU vis-à-vis its Member States...
Table of Contents: I. I. Introduction. – II. The law of integration. – II.1. The summa divisio of the modern law and the autonomous “sphere of intervention”. – II.2. The concept of law-making treaty and the search for a European constitution. – II.3. Jürgen Habermas and the revision of Kant’s cosmopolitan right. – III. The law of...
Abstract: Jurisprudential accounts of the autonomy of EU law have struggled to offer a compelling account of its unique features. Nevertheless, I argue that Ronald Dworkin’s court-centric methodological approach is better-suited than Hartian positivism to shed light on the notion that EU law is autonomous. This is because most questions about the...
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