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Table of Contents: 1. Introduction. – 2. EU budgetary governance and authority. – 2.1. The next MFF and its institutional foundations. – 2.2. The European executive in relation to the institutional balance. – 2.2.1. The executive power at the EU level in the institutional balance framework. – 2.2.2. The evolving executive role in EU budgetary governance. – 3. Continuing the transformation of the executive: the European Competitiveness Fund proposal. – 3.1. The ECF’s general architecture: from fragmentation to centralized, catalytic logic. – 3.1.1. Policy windows and flexible allocations. – 3.1.2. From programmatic fragmentation to centralized integration. – 3.1.3. The rise of a catalytic funding logic. – 3.1.4. Centralised budgetary steering and governance. – 3.2. Reconfiguration of implementation and delegation. – 3.2.1. The adoption of implementing acts foreseen in the European Competitiveness Fund proposal. – 3.2.2. The delegated acts foreseen under the European Competitiveness Fund proposal. – 4. Conclusion.
Abstract: What does the Multiannual Financial Framework proposal reveal about the Commission’s ambition for the future of the interinstitutional dynamics at the Union level? Recently, the EU budget has become an increasingly political and politicised instrument, as the Union’s spending power now appears as the main means through which it may pursue political objectives. In this context, understanding who holds the purse strings is a particularly sensitive question. Building on the literature addressing the rise of the executive, and especially the Commission, in EU economic governance, this article demonstrates that the proposal for a European Competitiveness Fund follows this trend and even reinforces it. The reliance on delegated and implementing acts, combined with the procedures envisaged for their adoption, places the Commission in a central position within a formally compliant institutional balance, yet subject to weak legal constraints and limited accountability mechanisms. The article concludes with policy recommendations to strengthen accountability in the allocation of EU funding.
Keywords: institutional balance – executive power – delegated and implementing acts – flexibility – budget – competitiveness.
1. Introduction
Which path is the European Commission charting for the future of European Union (EU) budgetary governance? The issue has long been debated in the academic doctrine, and the evolution of the Union has brought to the forefront the growing prominence of the executive power embodied in the European Commission (Commission), the Council, and the European Council, within its institutional architecture, sidelining the European Parliament (Parliament) and, in doing so, weakening mechanisms of accountability. This transformation, increasingly visible in the aftermath of successive crises, has redefined the relationship between efficiency, legitimacy and formal institutional balance. The consolidation of executive influence has increasingly shaped not only the Commission’s formal competences, but also the tools it uses to implement EU policy, particularly the financial framework and its related programmes.
Against this backdrop, the EU’s budgetary architecture serves as a lens for analysing its shifting political priorities and institutional dynamics. Far from being a merely technical exercise, the budget reflects the EU’s strategic vision, its capacity for collective action, and the interplay of power between institutions that shapes its governance. It is within this context that the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) constitutes the key instrument through which the EU defines both the scope and direction of its spending.[1] The negotiations of the MFF involve all the EU institutions, as provided for in the EU Treaties, and the Parliament plays a key role in supervising the execution of the EU budgets. Nonetheless, there is a certain degree of flexibility in defining how EU funds are disbursed, allocated, and spent, allowing for a certain power grab by executive institutions.[2]
In fact, recent developments reveal the growing prominence of the European executive, especially the Commission,[3] within which authority has become increasingly concentrated.[4] This article uses the proposal for a European Competitiveness Fund (ECF), derived from the Commission’s willingness, to test the consolidation of executive authority and the corresponding weakening of accountability within EU budgetary governance. The choice to focus on this proposed programme stems from its envisaged key role within the current reform of the EU’s budgetary architecture, and, according to the European Parliament, ‘the risk of centralisation of executive discretion in the Commission [...]’, in particular ‘implementation issues, notably those concerning flexibility of investment allocation and fund governance [...]’.[5]
Representing nearly one-fifth of the proposed 2028–2034 MFF, the combined envelope of the ECF and Horizon Europe would amount to more than €400 billion,[6] constituting a significant share of the EU’s financial capacity and falling under Heading 2, “Competitiveness, Prosperity and Security”, the main competitiveness policy heading of the 2028–2034 MFF, which is allocated €522 billion in commitments – more than double the corresponding amount in the 2017–2027 MFF.[7]
Beyond its size, the fund would embody the Commission’s new approach to budgetary governance, structured around flexibility, simplification and acceleration, central concepts in its discourse on the MFF.[8] Designed to support investment in strategic sectors and taking into account linked funds, the proposed ECF would operate through public-private partnerships,[9] deploying grants, guarantees, loans, and direct investments.[10] Its governance would be centralised through an ECF-specific comitology procedure, supported by advisory boards. The ECF proposal thereby marks a significant departure from the traditional model constrained by a closed legal framework and a multiplicity of actors. According to the Commission, it reflects a move away from pre-allocated, programme-driven spending to a more flexible,[11] objective-oriented logic, seeking to consolidate and rationalise previously fragmented programmes.[12] In doing so, it would enable the EU to operate with fewer procedural constraints and to streamline decision-making at the European Commission level, disclosing a strategic vision whose institutional implications this article examines.
While the proposal represents a coherent attempt to modernise EU funding, it also raises fundamental questions regarding the legal constraints on and accountability for executive discretion within the EU’s institutional framework.[13] This article argues that the central issue raised by the ECF proposal is not whether the Commission encroaches upon other institutions’ Treaty‑based functions, but the breadth of the discretion it enjoys within a formally respected institutional balance and the limited mechanisms to hold it to account for funding choices.
Methodologically, the analysis proceeds in two complementary steps. The first part examines EU budgetary governance and situates the European Commission’s growing executive role within the broader interinstitutional dynamics. It maps the preparation and design of the 2028–2034 MFF to identify patterns of executive empowerment, while clarifying the conceptual foundations of institutional balance alongside the evolving challenges of constraining executive discretion through successive crises and treaty reforms. The second part applies this analytical framework to the setting up of the envisaged ECF as an emblematic case study. It dissects the Fund’s design, from its consolidation of fragmented programmes under a catalytic logic to its reconfiguration of implementation through delegated and implementing acts, revealing how these mechanisms concretely extend Commission discretion and accelerate the shift towards executive predominance. In conclusion, this suggests that, while the principle of institutional balance remains formally intact, it proves insufficient to fully capture and effectively constrain the contemporary institutional interplay within the Union.
2. EU budgetary governance and executive authority
The reform of the 2028–2034 MFF provides an opportunity to explore how the EU’s long-term budget interacts with broader institutional dynamics. This part examines the evolving structures of budgetary governance and situates the European Commission’s growing executive role within the institutional framework. By mapping the design of budgetary governance and the preparation of the new MFF, including the emergence of EU programmes such as the ECF proposal, we can identify patterns of executive empowerment and assess their implications for EU governance.
2.1. The next MFF and its institutional foundations
Understanding the reform of the 2028–2034 MFF is necessary to contextualise the programmes through which recent developments in EU executive influence have taken shape. The preparation of the new framework has renewed attention to the Union’s long-term budget and to the principles that guide its adjustment, in a context marked by successive crises and an expanding demand for common public action. This environment has shaped the development of new programmes. Discussions on the future architecture of the budget have encouraged tools that respond to strategic objectives while remaining compatible with the Union’s financial constraints. The proposed ECF is one such programme and has become central to debates on how the next MFF should evolve, particularly contentious in institutional debates, where Parliament’s co-rapporteurs fear that merging successful programmes into large umbrella funds risks undermining proven policies, echoing resolution 2024/2051(INI), while the Council welcomes it as vital for competitiveness, urging rapid implementation.[14]
Initially, the MFF was designed to ensure budgetary predictability,[15] but it has evolved into a genuine policy tool structuring the Union’s long-term objectives and capacity for collective action.[16] Practically, the MFF sets legally binding expenditure ceilings by heading for a period of at least five years (in practice, seven years),[17] within which an annual budget allocates specific appropriations through a joint procedure involving the Commission, the Council and the Parliament.[18]
Currently, within an ongoing MFF, shifting or adapting spending follows a stepwise legal toolkit. Within each expenditure heading of the MFF, the Commission may adjust the allocation of funds to respond to evolving policy or financial needs. It can propose transfers or redeployments of appropriations between budget lines, provided these remain within the unused margins that exist below the annual expenditure ceilings.[19] When the available margins under a heading are exhausted, the system allows for special instruments, such as the Flexibility Instrument or the Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserve, to be mobilised. These tools operate outside the MFF ceilings and are activated through the annual budgetary procedure for predefined purposes.[20] If this system proves inadequate, a formal MFF revision, proposed by the Commission and adopted by the Council at unanimity with Parliament’s consent, can raise limits or create new capacity.[21] At the programme level, work programmes and calls are adjusted within basic acts, while amendments to budgets enable reprioritisation, provided commitments and payments remain within MFF ceilings.[22]
Yet, successive crises have exposed the limits of this system, as the 2021–2027 MFF was not designed to absorb shocks of the magnitude of the COVID‑19 pandemic or Russia’s war against Ukraine without resorting to off‑budget or exceptional instruments such as NextGenerationEU (NGEU) and the Ukraine Facility. At the same time, the multiplication of off‑budget instruments and the dense interconnection between the MFF regulation and sectoral legislation have increased the complexity of the system and,[23]further, according to the European institutions, constrained its room for manoeuvre, thereby reinforcing the perception that a renewal of the Union’s financial architecture is both necessary and difficult.[24] Against this background, the Commission aims to address three interrelated challenges, namely overall size, internal allocation, and funding sources, in the 2028–2034 MFF through a framework that combines greater flexibility, streamlined efficiency and stronger impact.[25]
In accordance with these objectives, the MFF proposal, corresponding to 1.26% of GNI, embodies a streamlined and flexible budgetary structure, innovative financing approaches, and strengthened mechanisms of transparency and democratic scrutiny. Ahead of its formal proposal, the Commission’s narrative aligned ostensibly with the Parliament’s call,[26] yet diverged on the role of executive discretion,[27] with the Commission advocating greater agility and centralised steering,[28] while the Parliament emphasised oversight and political responsiveness.[29] This trend may be exemplified by the proposed Interinstitutional Agreement on budgetary discipline, cooperation in budgetary matters, and sound financial management, which modernises cooperation and contingency frameworks and introduces structured flexibility, complementing the broader objectives pursued in the overall MFF reform.[30]
As part of this reform, the ECF proposal would crystallise this tendency by formalising the Commission’s operational and strategic discretion.[31] The Fund’s recitals repeatedly invoke terms such as ‘crisis’, ‘urgent’, and ‘accelerated intervention’, institutionalising a permanent crisis logic, allowing the Commission to act swiftly with limited procedural constraints.[32] On this basis, the ECF proposal seems to represent one of the latest manifestations of a trend at the EU level, through which the executive institutions gain further weight thanks to the mobilisation of extraordinary measures in the decision-making process, due to a situation of crisis, and their posterior normalisation.
Over the past decades, this general tendency has repeatedly manifested itself. In times of crisis and/or emergency, executive decision-making tends to prevail within the EU, allowing the Commission or another institution acting as an executive power to act swiftly with limited procedural constraint.[33] This element is problematic, as Saurugger and Terpan show that Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) case law during financial crises, notably Gauweiler and Weiss, tends to uphold executive measures while granting these institutions a broad margin of discretion, expanding their room for manoeuvre even where this may depart from core institutional principles, as appears to be the case in the present mechanism.[34]
2.2. The European executive in relation to the institutional balance
This evolution inevitably invites reflection on the institutional principles underpinning the EU’s constitutional order. The rise of the European Commission as a central executive actor – even as the continued influence of intergovernmental bodies, notably the Council and European Council, persists alongside a relative exclusion of the European Parliament from certain strategic budgetary decisions – is crucial for assessing the implications of executive predominance in EU governance and for examining how the principle of institutional balance is being operationalised. This section turns to the conceptual foundations of the Union’s institutional balance and the evolving role of the European executive, as a necessary step before analysing how the envisaged ECF reflects the underlying dynamics of inter-institutional power and patterns of constraint between institutions, taking into account the shifting power relations that shape its operation in practice in subsequent sections.
2.2.1. The executive power at the EU level in the institutional balance framework
Institutional balance (or interinstitutional balance) lies at the heart of the European system and of the successive phases of the EU development.[35] Situated at the intersection of the political and the legal,[36] this principle, with both descriptive and normative nature,[37] is inherently dynamic,[38] evolving in line with shifting priorities and adjustments in the division of competences.[39] In this study, the examination of institutional balance seeks to understand the role of the European executive and its accountability.
From a legal perspective, institutional balance constitutes a general structural principle of EU law,[40] alongside foundational developments originating from the Meroni case,[41] with its current legal foundation rooted in Article 13(2) TEU, secondary legislation, and the unwritten rules of EU law.[42] As an analytical tool for assessing horizontal relations of power between institutions,[43] the principle has been developed by the CJEU to regulate, frame, and ensure compliance with the relationships among EU institutions and the exercise of their respective competencies.[44] In this context, the principle helps evaluate how executive authority is exercised and, if so, constrained by other EU institutions. This entails safeguarding both the conferral and the division of competences and powers conferred upon the institutions by the Treaties to preserve their distinct roles within the institutional framework and to enable them to fulfil their respective tasks.[45] Accordingly, the application of this principle requires ensuring that no institution oversteps the competences of another,[46] nor delegates its powers in a manner that would undermine its own responsibility.[47] In fulfilling its structuring function within the institutional system, the principle also relies on the notion of exclusivity of competences, intrinsically linked to the identity of the author of the act.[48] It entails that the institutional balance may be understood in three distinct senses. First, each institution must act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by the Treaties. No institution may unilaterally extend its powers through constitutional practice, nor transfer them to another institution, unless expressly authorised by the Treaties. Second, each institution exercises its powers with due regard to those of the others, not to encroach upon those of others. Third, each institution operates within the EU’s governance procedures in a manner comparable to that observed in the relevant legislative procedure.[49]
Originally centred on a division between the Commission and the Council,[50] the architecture has progressively evolved into a quadripolar system, with the inclusion of the European Parliament and the emergence of the European Council.[51] This evolution has gone hand in hand with growing imprecision in the principle, particularly due to uncertainties surrounding the division of competences, providing scope for interpretative flexibility that predominant actors, notably the European Commission, have leveraged to expand executive authority.[52] This context seems to have recalibrated the institutional balance guidelines, with an emphasis on the executive function as exercised across several European institutions.
This prompts us to reflect on the executive’s place within the EU’s institutional framework for understanding the implications of programmes like the ECF proposal,[53] where executive discretion intersects with strategic budgetary priorities and may generate tension between legitimacy, effectiveness, and transparency within the EU’s legal and political order,[54] balancing democratic legitimacy and effective implementation of EU policies.[55] In the context of crisis‑driven budgetary instruments, institutional balance increasingly operates as a formal guarantee, while the real tension lies in how far executive discretion is legally framed and controlled.
In the absence of a unitary government distinct from the legislative and judicial branches, the scholars generally agree that the executive power may be understood as a ‘residual approach to executive power’.[56] This means that the executive authority rests on a constellation of institutions and actors exercising shared and, at times, overlapping competences, resulting from the growing complexity and densification of the institutional system, a phenomenon described as a ‘composite executive power’.[57] This fragmented and hierarchical structure is divided primarily among the European Commission, the Council, and the European Council,[58] with secondary roles played by the European Central Bank, the Eurogroup, and EU agencies,[59] highlighting the centrality of the Commission within the EU’s executive architecture and the partial exclusion of the European Parliament.[60]
Beyond executive authority, attention must turn to the executive act itself. In practice, while no formal definition of executive power exists within the EU, unlike that of legislative acts,[61] scholars generally describe it as comprising two interrelated dimensions, a political and an administrative one.[62] As Paul Craig has observed, the executive is typically entrusted with ‘the planning of legislative priorities and the political agenda, primary responsibility for foreign affairs and defence, a determining role in budgetary structuring and allocation, and responsibility for the effective implementation of adopted initiatives’.[63]
On this basis, the European Commission can be regarded as the core executive or central executive authority of the EU – although some observers emphasise the executive role of the Council or European Council due to their roles in the political agenda and in the foreign affairs –[64] not by virtue of exclusivity, but by reason of the competences and responsibilities conferred upon it,[65] which it exercises through its political arm (the College of Commissioners), its administrative and technocratic arm (the Directorates-General), and an extensive network of agencies.[66] The Commission’s functions have proliferated, reflecting the key features of a modern national executive. It initiates legislative proposals, implements policies and regulations through executive functions, exercises delegated competences, ensures the application of EU law, plays a role in external relations, implements programmes and budgets and performs coordination, execution, and supervisory tasks.[67]
2.2.2. The evolving executive role in EU budgetary governance
In recent years, the EU has witnessed a progressive consolidation of its executive structure, accompanied by the empowerment of institutions exercising executive functions, often to the detriment of the legislative branch.[68] Similar dynamics are also observable in the design and framing of the 2028–2034 MFF, which, as noted above, relies on a crisis-oriented vocabulary to codify operational discretion, providing a lens through which to anticipate its potential implications for the expansion of executive authority.
Particularly pronounced in the budgetary field, this phenomenon of executive expansion, which blurred the distinction between legislative and executive functions, has obscured traditional institutional boundaries.[69] This evolution, not confined to the budgetary sphere, tends to expand as it adapts to shifting economic and political contexts.[70] The patterns observed in programmes such as the NGEU or the Ukraine Facility suggest similar trajectories of centralisation and discretion, which will be explored in greater depth in the subsequent analysis.[71] This rise has coincided with limited European Parliament involvement, highlighting both a shift toward centralised executive authority and a relative exclusion of democratic oversight.
This trend first appears in the traditional structure where the Commission’s budgetary role entails responsibility for both revenue collection and expenditure execution,[72] with the European Parliament exercising control through annual discharge and the Court of Auditors auditing implementation.[73] Moreover, the Commission is required to publish an annual report detailing budget implementation.[74] Yet these mechanisms remain formal because discharge is retrospective and non-binding, while audit reports rarely trigger sanctions.[75] Additionally, while the Council continues to play a central role in legislative and budgetary procedures, it is the European Commission that drafts the annual budget proposal, subsequently adopted by the European Parliament and the Council.[76] Furthermore, the superimposition of national and supranational executive orders in the budgetary field has created an increasingly complex and cumulative institutional landscape, characterised by overlapping competences across multiple governance levels.[77] These factors produce a democratic accountability gap, within a formally preserved institutional balance, manifested in the Commission’s extensive discretionary latitude during implementation, limited democratic control by the European Parliament, and weak enforceability of oversight mechanisms, whether parliamentary or judicial.[78]
Driven by considerations of efficiency (output), frequently to the detriment of democratic legitimacy (input), this first manifestation calls for a rethinking of the European executive in which the Commission occupies a central position, further entrenched by recent crisis instruments.[79] Indeed, the supervision of crises has relied largely on economic and budgetary instruments, in which, although Member States remain key actors, the Commission’s executive role has been strengthened owing to its ostensible neutrality, impartiality, and responsibilities.[80]
As highlighted by the post-subprime crisis, the European Commission has become an indispensable actor in macroeconomic policy, coordinating national economic policies, safeguarding financial stability, supervising the financial sector, and performing strategic economic functions.[81] It now monitors and issues recommendations concerning the economic and budgetary policies of Member States, and may intervene correctively where necessary.[82] This phenomenon is visible in the establishment of the European Semester, which has strengthened interactions between the European Commission and national authorities. Through this mechanism, the Commission exerts a decisive influence on the content of national budgets, thereby enhancing its executive authority vis-à-vis Member States.[83] Moreover, to ensure the effectiveness of the new regulatory framework, there has been a shift from binding norms to soft-law instruments, thereby strengthening the Commission’s capacity to supervise national economic policies.[84]
It appears natural that the institution responsible for coordinating economic policies should also oversee the implementation of the NGEU programme, to optimise synergies and reduce administrative complexity.[85] Likewise, entrusting the European Commission with the implementation and monitoring of NGEU funds aligns with its established responsibilities for cohesion policy funds.[86]Through the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), the European Commission assumed a driving role in the definition, negotiation and monitoring of national reform plans, leveraging its ability to shape political priorities and to condition disbursements upon compliance with agreed objectives.[87] By contrast, the European Parliament lacks decision-making powers over either the substance of these reforms or the allocation of the funds. This development marks the rise of a strong executive predominance, dominated by the Commission and the European Council, yet accompanied by a weakening of the European Parliament and, consequently, of the EU’s democratic legitimacy.[88] In consequence, the RRF constitute the first and major turning point, where crisis‑driven arrangements institutionalised broad executive discretion and marginalised parliamentary oversight in the allocation of large‑scale EU funding, without enough accountability.
In sum, the succession of crises has strengthened the executive dimension of EU governance and weakened accountability mechanisms, privileging speed over scrutiny.[89] The shift to special programmes outside the MFF bypasses relevant legislative procedures and limits ex ante Parliament input, while implementation relies on Commission-led negotiations with Member States that evade direct parliamentary oversight.[90] The European Commission emerges as the institution most capable of assuming these responsibilities and upholding the pursuit of the common good in line with the principle of institutional balance, as formally interpreted in European law.[91] This role rests upon its institutional legitimacy, technocratic expertise, and relative political neutrality, while the Parliament has been relegated to a consultative function.[92]
Although the Commission can be said to remain subject to the control of the European Parliament and the Council in theory, accountability mechanisms are, in practice, rather limited.[93] Parliamentary scrutiny and transparency requirements largely sustain an appearance of oversight rather than effective control. This limitation manifests in fragmented reporting across programmes or reliance on soft-law commitments that elude binding enforcement.[94]
If the strengthening of the European executive can be observed across multiple policy areas, as pointed above, the budgetary sphere offers the most tangible and revealing manifestation of this shift in favour of the Commission.[95] Its supervisory powers have expanded beyond public finances in response to the crises. The European Commission has asserted itself as a central executive actor, wielding increased influence over Member States’ economic priorities through its role in implementing assistance programmes and post-crisis budgetary surveillance, raising concerns about the balance between efficiency and democratic accountability.[96] The EU’s response to prolonged and cumulative crises demonstrates that its institutional framework is no longer a fixed structure, but rather a flexible arrangement, continuously adjusted in parallel with political negotiations and evolving governance needs.[97]
Importantly, these developments occur within a formally respected institutional balance, but they raise serious doubts about the adequacy of legal constraints on executive discretion and effective accountability for funding choices. These changes point to a recent yet potentially enduring shift of the EU’s institutional gravity toward the European executive, notably the Commission, a trend whose continuation may be assessed in the context of the upcoming MFF. In this respect, the budgetary sphere offers a particularly revealing vantage point, as budgetary instruments not only reflect processes of institutional adaptation but also disclose the mechanisms through which executive authority is asserted and normalised within the EU’s governance architecture.
Situated within this evolving institutional and budgetary environment, the analysis seeks to anticipate how executive authority may be further consolidated, while remaining attentive to the complex interplay of legal, political and procedural constraints shaping EU governance. Against this backdrop, the ECF proposal consolidates and normalises a discretionary executive model embedded within the ordinary MFF. The following sections turn to the proposed ECF as an illustration of the materialisation of the European Commission’s executive role through budgetary governance.
3. Continuing the transformation of the executive: the European Competitiveness Fund proposal
The ECF proposal exemplifies the ongoing transformation of EU budgetary governance, reflecting the Commission’s evolving role in the budgetary sphere. The analysis shifts from identifying who holds executive powers to examining the legal and procedural constraints (or lack thereof) that govern the Commission’s discretion. To do so, the discussion begins with a descriptive overview of the Fund’s general architecture, highlighting the consolidation of programmes, the establishment of thematic policy windows, and the shift towards a centralised and catalytic logic. Then, the second part examines how this architecture translates into institutional predominance through its implementation framework. The extensive reliance on delegated and implementing acts, coupled with reconfigured comitology and evaluation mechanisms, concretises executive discretion and reconfigures traditional oversight patterns.
3.1. The ECF’s general architecture: from fragmentation to centralised, catalytic logic
The establishment of the proposed ECF would mark a significant restructuring around a coherent and integrated architecture conceived to ensure strategic focus and operational coordination throughout the innovation and competitiveness chain.[98] Whereas previous spending was channelled through functionally distinct and isolated programmes with separate legal bases, management structures and logics of intervention,[99] the proposal would introduce a single and unified overarching framework governed by a single rulebook setting out common principles for alternative, combined, and cumulative funding. Departing from a fragmented galaxy of funds,[100] the envisaged ECF would merge 14 existing financial instruments,[101] combine them with new resources, and double the overall volume of funding under its four flexible policy windows.[102] While intended to transform the budget into a politically driven programme granting the Commission substantial discretion, this reorganisation calls into question the capacity of both the European Parliament and the Member States to influence strategic priorities. This allows us to proceed to an examination, given that ‘the principle of institutional balance cannot be assessed in the abstract, but depends on a concrete assessment of the impact of a contested act or omission on the specifically identified prerogatives of one (or more) EU institutions’.[103]
The draft Regulation provides, practically, indicative allocations for each policy window and objective.[104] The four policy windows cover broad strategic areas (Resilience and Security, Defence Industry and Space; Clean Industrial Transformation; Digital and Deep Tech; and Health, Biotech, Agriculture & Bioeconomy), each endowed with an indicative multiannual envelope that can be adjusted within defined margins during the annual budget procedure. Moreover, within each of its thematic windows, work programmes encompass collaborative research and innovation activities, thereby securing a continuous investment pathway from research to manufacturing and deployment. Furthermore, implementing this transformation requires prompt and coordinated action to efficiently convert objectives into concrete results, without being constrained by procedural bottlenecks. Close stakeholder involvement throughout the programming process is necessary to facilitate coordination and rapid decision-making.[105]
3.1.1. Policy windows and flexible allocations
Under the current framework, funding for research, innovation, industrial policy, and strategic infrastructure remains dispersed across multiple instruments, each governed by distinct envelopes, work programmes, and comitology arrangements. This fragmentation, widely documented by the European Court of Auditors and analyses by institutional experts,[106] limits, according to the Commission, cross-programme coordination and constrains the Commission’s ability to reorient resources swiftly in response to political priorities.[107]
The envisaged ECF would replace this fragmented landscape with four broad policy windows, each corresponding to a cluster of strategic objectives. Rather than predetermining detailed allocations by programme, the draft Regulation fixes only an indicative financial envelope at the window level, leaving the granular distribution across instruments and actions to annual or multiannual work programmes.[108] It can be inferred that the proposal allows for a flexible redistribution of funds both between and within policy windows during the budgetary process, enabling adjustments to evolving priorities and needs agreed by the budgetary authority while remaining consistent with legal commitments.[109]
This design would also allow for deviations of up to 20% from the indicative financial envelope of the programme over its entire duration, pursuant to the commitment detailed in the proposed Interinstitutional Agreement on budgetary discipline and cooperation. Although the indicative envelope is defined at the programme level, this margin of deviation may, in practice, permit adjustments between a programme’s internal policy windows without requiring a formal revision of the basic legislative act, provided new circumstances are duly justified. Larger deviations would be permitted only where such new and objective circumstances arise, including in relation to evolving policy priorities.[110]
Taken together, these provisions introduce three distinct but cumulative forms of flexibility, namely structural flexibility through the use of broad policy windows and indicative envelopes, implementation flexibility through work programmes and redistributions, and quantitative flexibility through deviations from indicative financial envelopes, up to 20%, and beyond under duly justified circumstances. This architecture reflects a willingness to move away from the ‘programme-by-programme’ model that has long dominated EU budgetary practice, towards a system structured by overarching policy orientations. By pooling resources under four thematic umbrellas, the proposed ECF seeks to facilitate cross-sectoral coordination and align EU-level priorities with national implementation pathways.[111]
Nevertheless, we contend that this increased use of flexibility can lead to several concerns about the European institutional framework. As pointed out by the European Parliament, ‘this shift to a more flexible, possibly politically driven governance raises questions about politicisation of funding decisions. It also challenges the MFF’s core objective: establishing a stable, long-term financial framework and avoiding the complexities of yearly budgetary adjustments’.[112] This issue is endorsed by the European Court of Auditors, which, contrary to the Parliament, recognises the ECF’s potential to combine long-term stability with the capacity to reallocate resources rapidly across policy areas; it nonetheless identifies two risks arising from this flexible design. First, the application of flexibility to Member State contributions, notably through NRRP resources, may lead to overlaps, double funding, and legal uncertainty with regard to State aid rules. Second, the absence of clearly defined performance safeguards, notably regarding the revolving capacity of financial instruments and the absence of targets for InvestEU.[113]
3.1.2. From programmatic fragmentation to centralised integration
Building on this window‑based structure, which replaced a fragmented landscape, the proposal aims to merge 14 funds by integrating 12 funds – sometimes partially –[114] into the ECF proposal and enhancing cooperation with the Innovation Fund and Horizon Europe, which remains a self-standing framework programme, implemented through two specific programmes.[115] The ECF and Horizon Europe proposals would be closely coordinated through a joint single rule book to ensure a seamless investment pathway from research to manufacturing and deployment, allowing both programmes to support innovation activities within their respective remits in a complementary and reinforcing manner. While the potential for long-term stability and rapid resource reallocation is acknowledged, we agree with the European Court of Auditors’ caution that increased complexity may arise from interactions between the ECF, Horizon Europe, and other linked instruments, particularly in the absence of clearly defined synergies and alignment mechanisms, despite the common rulebook.[116]
Breaking the current “pots” system, where many of the integrated instruments are currently split into multiple earmarked sub‑envelopes with tight reallocation margins, would create a unified and flexible pool of resources.[117] Although most integrated funds are relatively small, they total €231.4 billion (€207.5 billion in 2025 prices),[118] to be supplemented by €175 billion (€155 billion in 2025 prices) from Horizon Europe,[119] which, although governed by its own regulations, would have part of its resources and financing scheduled under the ECF proposal,[120] and, by more than €70 billion from the Connecting Europe Facility through the heading II. Moreover, the InvestEU instrument, a flagship instrument according to the Draghi report,[121] would be deployed across the four windows to promote investment in different fields, offering guarantees.[122] However, this approach to consolidation stands in contrast with the European Parliament’s 7 May 2025 resolution on the revamped long-term budget, in which MEPs, building on the advantages of InvestEU, rejected the creation of large umbrella funds by merging currently successful programmes.[123]
At first sight, such integration may appear as a purely technical simplification. However, it also centralises the levers through which the Commission can calibrate financial support across the innovation and industrial value chain. This change would redefine not only the scope of the instruments but also their underlying rationale, establishing a mode of budgetary action departing from administrative segmentation. The move towards an integrated financial framework goes hand in hand with a re-centring of budgetary authority, signalling a shift towards executive centralisation. This organisational integration enables a catalytic funding logic that allows the Commission to steer the investment choices of Member States and private actors, reinforcing its position as a central orchestrator of European competitiveness.
3.1.3. The rise of a catalytic funding logic
Within the existing structure, Member States have limited possibilities to channel national resources into other Union instruments, and strategic coordination across programmes remained weak.[124] Beyond the elimination of the fragmented landscape, the envisaged ECF would operate as a catalytic programme, based on its EU added value, channelling public and private resources under a single strategic umbrella.[125] The integration of InvestEU across the four thematic windows illustrates this catalytic logic, designed to mobilise guarantees and investments across multiple fields.[126] Within a given window, grants for research and innovation can be combined with pre‑commercial procurement, guarantees and other financial instruments, creating leverage on private capital while maintaining a single strategic orientation.[127]
The proposal would deploy a wide range of financial instruments to maximise its catalytic effect on private investment, understood as the use of EU budgetary instruments to mobilise and orient investment decisions by Member States and private actors through leverage, risk-sharing conditionality and strategic coordination.[128] It would shift from an implementing style based on pre-allocated, programme-driven spending to ‘grants, prizes, procurement, non-financial donations, budgetary guarantees, and financial instruments’,[129] thereby sharing risk with private investors and attracting additional capital to strategic projects. In this sense, the award criteria and funding mixes of the proposed regulation are largely defined in work programmes under each window, rather than fixed ex ante for each programme as in the current architecture.[130] For instance, the InvestEU part within the ECF proposal uses budgetary guarantees to encourage private partners to finance high-value initiatives. This approach aims to create a financial leverage effect, amplifying the impact of every euro spent by the EU while aligning private investment with the EU’s strategic and policy objectives.
In addition to mobilising EU-level resources and private investments, the envisaged ECF would also create structured mechanisms for Member States to channel additional resources into high-quality projects. According to the ECF proposal, Member States may contribute additional funding, including EU cohesion funds. To facilitate this, the proposal would introduce a Competitiveness Seal,[131]based on earlier labels such as the Excellence Seal and the Sovereignty seal,[132] awarded to projects that meet all evaluation criteria under ECF procedures.[133] This Seal would render such projects eligible for national or cohesion funding and is intended to serve as a quality guarantee for institutional investors.[134] This centralisation enables a new form of flexibility for Member States, which may include the redirection of cohesion funds or the use of alternative funding sources, including cumulative support, facilitated by the proposed Seal.
This catalytic logic extends the Commission’s influence beyond the mere execution of appropriations, enabling it to steer both national and private investment. By mobilising EU resources, private capital, and additional contributions from Member States, facilitated through instruments such as the Competitiveness Seal, the ECF aims to leverage each euro spent while aligning investments with EU strategic objectives. The effectiveness of this approach, however, ultimately depends on the governance arrangements that determine how priorities are set and projects selected.[135] Moreover, as mentioned above, the possibility for Member States and third parties to make additional contributions to the Fund, most notably through NRRP resources, raises concerns about overlaps, double funding, and reporting in the absence of sufficiently clear monitoring and allocation rules, as well as persistent legal uncertainties surrounding national contributions channelled through a centralised instrument, which may be incompatible with State aid rules.[136]
3.1.4. Centralised budgetary steering and governance
On the governance side, the annual budgetary cycle is framed not merely as a technical exercise, but as a strategic planning moment in which the European Commission can steer the proposed fund in line with broader priorities. This approach aligns programme administration with overarching EU competitiveness goals, making resource allocation a matter of strategic guidance rather than purely administrative execution. By contrast, current EU programmes in these fields are dispersed across multiple committees, advisory boards and partnership structures, often organised on a programme‑specific basis and reflecting distinct communities of practice. Building on its centralised and catalytic funding logic, the ECF proposal would establish a centralised and dynamic steering system to translate strategic priorities into concrete actions.[137]
This dynamic steering system would rely on advisory boards, including the Strategic Stakeholder Board, at three different levels – fund, window and extra, and on the Competitiveness Coordination Tool.[138] This integrated strategy leverages processes such as the European Semester and the Competitiveness Coordination Tool, coordinated by the Commission, to identify EU-level priorities that will inform the annual budgetary decisions for the proposed ECF and related instruments.[139]
The Strategic Stakeholder Board, composed of sectoral experts appointed by the European Commission for a period of four years,[140] would be tasked with advising on the general orientation of the ECF proposal, anticipating competitiveness trends, identifying market failures or under-investment, and recommending portfolios of strategic projects.[141] The proposal foresees that this board would be composed of members appointed by the Commission, further consolidating its influence.
Parallel boards would support InvestEU and Horizon Europe. InvestEU would retain its own advisory board,[142] composed of representatives from Member States and implementing partners and chaired by a Commission representative, which provides advice on implementation, additional guidance on financial products and strategic orientations.[143] The European Commission would also establish the rules governing the board’s composition and functioning,[144] weakening the insulation of investment decisions from political influence. Horizon Europe boards, including the EIC Board and the ERC Scientific Council, would continue to inform programming and project selection. Strategic programming is reinforced by internal assessment capacities, such as the Observatory of Emerging Technologies, which provides analytical support to the Strategic Stakeholder Board. As specified by the European Parliament, ‘this is expected to allow the EU to respond more flexibly [...]. However, the [...] poses important implementation challenges’.[145]
Against this backdrop, we share the view of the European Court of Auditors, which notes that the roles and interactions of these advisory boards remain insufficiently clarified, stressing the need to precisely delineate their responsibilities and coordination within examination procedures to avoid governance opacity, and warns that without such mechanisms the structure risks increasing complexity rather than enhancing accountability, prompting the Court to call for the Commission ‘to clarify the roles and responsibilities of these bodies and define how they will interact in advisory and examination procedures’.[146]
On the other side, the Competitiveness Coordination Tool plays a central role in aligning national and European priorities, ensuring that Member State contributions and strategies are coordinated with EU-wide objectives. Complementing these structures, the European Commission would produce an annual integrated strategy report, structured by major policy areas. Drawing on sectoral processes such as the European Semester, the report would provide a comprehensive overview of EU funding priorities. This steering system, in turn, interacts with the policy windows, providing the framework through which flexible allocations are determined annually.[147]
This reconfiguration cannot be understood in isolation but is derived from the objectives underpinning the proposed instrument and the forthcoming MFF, which emphasise simplification, flexibility, responsiveness, and an impactful budget. While these objectives justify a move away from rigid, programme-based allocation, they also entail a reconfiguration of scrutiny, as the mechanisms designed to enable adaptive and rapid intervention simultaneously affect the capacity to shape and effectively oversee the allocation of resources.
Taken together, and in light of the instrument’s stated objectives, these four structural features do not merely expand the Commission’s operational flexibility, but also transform the conditions under which its action can be scrutinised. By shifting key allocative decisions to the level of work programmes, enabling reallocations within and across policy windows, and embedding strategic steering in hybrid advisory structures largely shaped by the Commission, the proposed framework displaces oversight away from the moments and instruments traditionally associated with budgetary control, in particular those exercised ex ante by the budgetary authority.
While the European Parliament formally retains its discharge powers and the European Court of Auditors continues to exercise ex post audit functions, these mechanisms operate on outputs that are increasingly difficult to trace back to discrete, legally circumscribed decisions, complicating both political accountability and performance assessment. This shift is reinforced by the integration of multiple instruments and the mobilisation of additional public and private resources, which blur the lines of responsibility and render the attribution of outcomes more complex across levels of governance. As the Court has repeatedly underlined, such flexibility risks blurring lines of responsibility and complicating performance assessment.
In this configuration, scrutiny is not formally removed, but rendered more diffuse, reflecting a broader shift from ex ante control embedded in legislative design towards more indirect and ex post forms of oversight, and from clearly bounded programme structures towards a more centralised and executive-driven mode of budgetary steering. Consequently, this could constitute a major reconfiguration of European budgetary governance, accentuated by additional debates and risks regarding the geographical rules and the consolidation process, underscoring the persistent vagueness and lack of clarity surrounding this Fund.[148] It looks to prioritise flexibility and speed over ex ante legal constraints and effective ex post accountability.
3.2. Reconfiguration of implementation and delegation
The ECF proposal would epistomise this executive transformation through its extensive use of implementing and delegated acts,[149] under which the Commission has historically enjoyed substantial discretion over both instruments.[150] This practice, embedded in Articles 290 and 291 TFEU,[151] responds to a dual imperative: simplifying legislative processes and further developing European law, while preserving the structural balance of the EU’s institutional order,[152] with transparency being a central principle guiding their use.[153] Yet this technique has drawn doctrinal criticism for transferring major policy choices from the legislative branch to Commission discretion, generating institutional tensions and accountability gaps.[154] In this regard, authors have warned that extensive recourse to delegated and implementing acts transfers substantive policy choices from the legislative arena to Commission discretion and that this shift has generated institutional tensions and accountability gaps,[155] while progressively constraining the Parliament’s capacity to exercise the influence formally conferred upon it by the Treaties.[156]
3.2.1. The adoption of implementing acts foreseen in the European Competitiveness Fund proposal
Used in this proposal, implementing acts, subject to the comitology procedure, arise where the uniform application of legally binding EU legislation is necessary.[157] In such cases, it vests the European Commission – or an agency – with the powers needed to ensure consistent implementation.[158] These general principles would provide the legal basis for the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers under the ECF proposal, particularly for the adoption of work programmes and other measures requiring coordination with Member States and uniform conditions in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011.[159] These work programmes would establish the operational parameters and framework for implementing the proposal and would determine the budget allocated to each policy window. They would specify the actions to be undertaken and their associated budget, including those in dedicated parts of the programmes, as well as the instruments and forms of funding to be used. The work programmes would also establish eligibility and award criteria, co-financing rates for grants, and the application of mechanisms. Additionally, they would set out the rules applicable to actions addressing multiple objectives and actions subject to specific conditions regarding ownership, exploitation, dissemination, transfer, licensing, and access to results. Finally, they would indicate which actions benefit from specific implementation mechanisms under the proposed ECF.[160]
Under the current framework, the 14 financing programmes are implemented via work programmes adopted by the Commission,[161] which define the themes, instruments, funding modalities, and eligibility criteria.[162] The adoption of these work programmes typically involves comitology committees under two regimes. First, the advisory procedure, where the committee gives an opinion, but the Commission can adopt the programme regardless (e.g., ERC under HE).[163] Under this procedure, the relevant committee delivers its opinion on a draft implementing act, taking a vote if necessary, with a simple majority of its members required to adopt a position. The European Commission is obliged to take the committee’s opinion ‘utmost account of’ when adopting the draft act. Still, it retains ultimate discretion to proceed with adoption, reflecting a relatively low level of control by the Member States, allowing for consultation and guidance rather than binding oversight.[164]
Second, the examination procedure, where the Commission may adopt the programme unless the committee issues a negative opinion (e.g., HE excluding ERC, Digital Europe, CEF, Single Market Programme – SMEs)[165] and the enhanced examination procedure, where a positive committee vote is required for adoption (e.g., EU4Health, EDF, ESP, ASAP, EDIRPA, EDIP, USC),[166] embodying a better form of control. Committees vote according to qualified-majority rules with weighted votes reflecting the relative representation of Member States. A positive opinion triggers automatic adoption by the European Commission. In contrast, a negative opinion generally precludes adoption, subject to limited resubmission options either to the same committee or an appeal committee, thereby granting the committee a de facto veto power.[167]
Under the ECF proposal, the prevailing logic of control would be inverted compared to earlier practice. Whereas the (enhanced) examination procedure formerly constituted the default mechanism, conferring substantial blocking powers to Member States, the advisory procedure now applies as the standard for the vast majority of programme components. This shift would reflect a move to confer flexibility on the Commission, allowing it to adopt implementing acts at its discretion while taking the committees’ opinions into account on a purely consultative basis,[168] appearing less as a departure than as an accentuation of a post-Lisbon pattern, in which efforts to strengthen democratic oversight have not translated into sustained involvement.[169]
At first sight, both the advisory procedure and the examination procedure may apply in the context of implementing acts relating to the four ECF windows included in the specific objectives.[170] Determining which components fall under the advisory procedure and which under the examination procedure requires reference to the articles and recitals, which articulate the European Commission’s intentions. It appears that the ECF General Committee, the Clean Transition Committee, the Health, Biotech, Agriculture and Bioeconomy Committee, the Digital Committee and the Resilience Committee would be governed by Article 4 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011.[171] This implies that although an opinion must be sought from the competent committee when this is required, such an opinion is purely advisory.[172]
Nevertheless, due to the sensitive nature and importance of certain matters in the fields of resilience and security, defence industry and space, the examination procedure would be applied by default in this specific context in accordance with Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011, under the negative opinion procedure.[173] Even within these matters, in particular those related to space, certain exceptions exist in that they would require only the application of the advisory procedure.[174] Furthermore, the proposal does not clearly specify which procedure should apply to certain sensitive criteria relating to the exercise of decisive influence over entities involved in EU space systems.[175]
Finally, in accordance with Article 8 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011, a derogation would be authorised from the standard one for situations of duly justified urgency directly tied to ECF implementation if a work programme is not adopted by 1 October of the prior year, or in crises or exceptional emergencies requiring immediate action.[176] The Commission can then adopt immediately applicable acts without prior committee scrutiny, subject to ex post relevant committee consultation and annulment if a negative opinion is delivered under examination procedure, for a period not exceeding six months.[177]
Given the Commission’s considerable flexibility under the advisory procedure, this discretion extends directly to the work programmes. As mentioned above, the work programmes establish the award criteria that determine which projects are eligible for funding. This combination, broad executive latitude and the centrality of the award criteria, would create a situation in which the Commission can effectively shape funding outcomes at its own discretion.[178] This configuration reflects an already entrenched framework, which the proposal seeks to temper only indirectly through mechanisms of stakeholder consultation, notably via advisory boards, without structurally constraining the Commission’s discretion.[179] For example, it is worth noting that the minimum amount of €17 billion in EU support, delivered through the ECF InvestEU Instrument to contribute to both the general and specific objectives of the envisaged ECF, would be supplemented by contributions from the work programmes, adopted in accordance with the relevant comitology procedures, which provide a flexible mechanism to allocate additional resources. Such envisaged contributions serve as a preferred means of implementation within the ECF proposal, either to fund the budgetary guarantee or to finance financial instruments.[180]
Against this background, we must contrast these consultative arrangements with the project evaluation mechanisms traditionally applied across most of the 14 funding programmes composing the envisaged ECF. In most of these programmes, project evaluation currently relies on evaluation committees of independent experts and on objective criteria such as excellence, impact, and quality of implementation. This committee is a group of experts tasked with assessing project proposals against predefined criteria, providing independent and objective recommendations on whether EU funding should be awarded.[181] The ECF proposal, however, would depart from this model, introducing a system that would reduce the role of independent evaluation and enhance the Commission’s discretion in project selection.[182] As Jarlebring observes, this model must be read in conjunction with Financial Regulation 2024/2509, which Article 155 stipulates that external experts may only be used where explicitly foreseen in the basic act.[183]
The wording of the proposal remains ambiguous in several respects. Indeed, within the section on the single rulebook governing all policy areas, the provision on ‘implementation and forms of Union support’ states that, for research and innovation activities, ‘the evaluation committee may be composed partially or fully of independent external experts’.[184] This would create uncertainty as to whether one should interpret this as implying that all matters relating to the proposed ECF fall under research and innovation, such that each committee must include independent experts, or whether it applies only to a specific category of projects, with no requirement for experts in other areas. We adhere to the latter interpretation. This reading is supported by the provision applicable to defence-related activities, according to which the evaluation committee may be assisted by independent external experts holding valid personal security clearance, if required by the work programme.[185] This assistance is subject to numerous conditions and framed in explicitly conditional terms, suggesting that the involvement of external experts is intended to be sector-specific rather than a general requirement across all ECF-funded activities.
This governance ambiguity has already drawn parliamentary scrutiny, noting that ‘the role of stakeholders and independent experts in project selection and strategic direction is still under negotiation [and] the transparency of the governance shaping the allocation of spending faces scrutiny’.[186] Similar concerns are echoed by the European Court of Auditors, which acknowledges the objective of simplification while noting that the proposed framework would allow the award of funding without competitive calls and evaluation arrangements that do not rely exclusively on independent experts, and calls for clearer procedural safeguards and clarifications to preserve transparency, equal treatment and sound financial management.[187]
3.2.2. The delegated acts foreseen under the European Competitiveness Fund proposal
The effective implementation of the ECF proposal would also require the Commission to use delegated acts, non-legislative acts adopted pursuant to a legislative act, designed to amend or supplement non-essential elements of that act,[188] and allowing for the transfer of ‘substantive legislative powers’ without the act itself qualifying as a European legislative act.[189] For a delegated act to be valid, two conditions must be fulfilled. First, it may only concern non-essential elements, meaning those not subject to political discretion. Second, the legislative act adopted by the European Parliament and the Council must explicitly define ‘the objectives, content, scope, and duration of the delegation of power’.[190] Furthermore, delegated acts are no longer governed by comitology.[191] While national expert committees play a role in monitoring the Commission’s executive activity, the control of delegated acts lies with the legislator, rendering the expert’s intervention unnecessary.[192]
Within the framework of this proposal, the European Commission would also intend to exercise delegated powers. On the one hand, in the space component, the Commission may adopt delegated acts ‘in accordance with Article 84 to supplement Copernicus data and information policy’[193] and to supplement ‘[...] the detailed list of tasks to be performed by the SST Partnership’[194] or ‘the list of non-core users and specify the services that they may have access to’[195] in the Space Surveillance and Tracking’s matter. On the other hand, in a context more subject to concern, the ECF proposal would grant the European Commission the power to adopt delegated acts to adjust two key parameters connected with the ECF Invest EU’s budget-guarantee mechanism, namely the provisioning rate and the maximum amount of the budgetary guarantee (up to a variation of 20% of that amount).[196]
This delegation would be significant for multiple reasons. Indeed, if one refers to the figures in the proposal, ‘the maximum amount of the budgetary guarantee under the EU Compartment of the ECF InvestEU Instrument shall be €70 billion in current prices. It shall be provisioned at the rate of 50%’.[197] Hence, through this mechanism, it would endow the European Commission with a flexible instrument to respond rapidly to evolving circumstances, without requiring the full legislative procedure. This certainly implies greater responsiveness, but grants significant power regarding the sums involved. By enabling the European Commission to amend Article 21(3) of the proposal, the delegated act mechanism would allow for fine-tuning of the financial buffer and guarantee conditions underpinning the ECF proposal.
Beyond the matters for which delegated acts may be adopted, it is also necessary to consider the procedure for adopting such acts. In general practice, expert consultation before the finalisation of delegated acts remains a common occurrence. This practice is grounded in the technical complexity of such acts, which often requires specialised expertise.[198] The European Commission consults ad hoc expert groups to assist in drafting delegated acts. These groups differ from comitology committees. Their composition is flexible, tailored to the specific needs, and their function is to provide specialised technical input.[199]
This practice is encouraged by the legislator during the preparation of delegated acts, yet the European Commission remains the sole institution empowered to adopt them.[200] In practice, the exercise of this power is nevertheless shaped by expert input, as illustrated in highly technical fields such as financial services legislation.[201] In this case, the proposal would provide for an obligation to consult experts designated by the Member States. These consultations would offer additional guidance to the Commission but are not binding and represent only the Member States, leaving the Parliament aside, thereby reflecting a related concern regarding the independence of experts highlighted above.[202]
Building on this, it is necessary to examine the formal mechanisms through which delegated acts are controlled. Usually, the Council retains a strong institutional position, the European Commission exercises a central part of executive power, and the European Parliament is granted a genuine oversight function.[203] These controls operate both upstream, by defining the delegation’s objectives, scope, and duration, and downstream, through procedures allowing objection, revocation, or judicial review.[204] Together, they establish a multi-layered framework of oversight, balancing the Commission’s discretionary powers with institutional safeguards.
Firstly, the ex ante control of delegated acts includes the conditions outlined above concerning the delegation’s objectives, content, scope and duration.[205] This control is important in sensitive policy areas, as the delegated matters were originally meant to be included in the basic legislative act. The legislator must define both the form (duration and objectives) and the substance (scope and content) of the delegation. Accordingly, variations in the degree of control exercised over delegated acts should be explained by the relative importance of the elements delegated and by the requirements laid down in the Treaties.[206]
In terms of form, the delegation of powers to the European Commission in this case would be framed by Article 84, which defines the duration of the delegation. The delegation would be granted for a period between the entry into force of the act and 31 December 2035.[207] In terms of substance, the delegation conferred by the proposal would be particularly far-reaching in the field of the ECF InvestEU. It empowers the Commission, by means of delegated acts, to adjust two core parameters of the budgetary guarantee mechanism, namely the provisioning rate and the maximum amount of the guarantee, within a margin of up to 20% as laid down in Article 21(3). Taken together with the initial figures set in the basic act (€70 billion as the maximum amount of the guarantee, provisioned at a rate of 50%), this broad and financially significant margin of manoeuvre illustrates the remarkable discretion granted to the Commission in shaping the operational framework of the Fund, departing from the traditional model in which delegated powers are confined to strictly technical adjustments.
Secondly, ex post control mechanisms may be exercised through objection or revocation procedures, as provided in the legislative act, which may be triggered by one of the co-legislators.[208] Under the proposal, the European Parliament or the Council may revoke the delegation at any time, terminating the Commission’s power to adopt delegated acts.[209] Additionally, it provides for an objection procedure.[210] Both institutions would be notified, and have a period of two months, extendable by a further two months, to object to a delegated act before it enters into force.[211] In practice, this ex post control provides a residual check on executive authority, but its reactive nature contrasts with the extensive ex ante empowerment granted to the Commission. This highlights the asymmetry between flexibility and accountability, resulting in a framework in which the formal roles of the Parliament and Council have limited impact in practice.[212]
In this sense, it should be noted that the control mechanisms have, in practice, been only sparingly used by the co-legislators. The European Parliament and the Council have rarely exercised their rights of objection or revocation, thereby limiting the effectiveness of these safeguards. This limited activation is compounded by broader structural features of the Article 290 framework, which leave a significant margin of discretion both to the legislature in defining the scope of delegation and to the Commission in exercising it, while judicial review remains relatively restrained. As a result, the system tends to operate as a framework of formal rather than substantive control, reinforcing the asymmetry between the Commission’s discretion and the constraints effectively imposed upon it.[213]
Thirdly, in this regard, judicial oversight by the CJEU would remain an ultimate safeguard. Compliance with the conditions of the delegated acts requires a strict application of both the provisions and the spirit of the Treaties, as divergent interpretations of Article 290 TFEU risk creating institutional issues.[214] Nevertheless, this judicial safeguard cannot replace the framework established by the legislative act itself, in particular where the latter grants excessive discretion to the Commission.
Taken together with the rest of the section, these changes would enhance the Commission’s executive discretion, both in defining funding priorities and in evaluating individual projects. The new model moves away from rule-based, expert-driven assessment towards a more politically managed allocation of EU resources, allowing the European Commission greater freedom to pick the winners. Institutionally, this would represent a shift in the interinstitutional dynamics towards the Commission’s executive power, with reduced oversight from Member States or the European Parliament and diminished reliance on external expertise. Furthermore, it would imply greater uncertainty for firms and investors regarding access to EU funds, as the determination of award criteria and project selection becomes increasingly subject to political and administrative judgment rather than transparent evaluative standards.
In light of the foregoing, the European Commission would emerge as the central actor, endowed with broad discretion across both implementing and delegated acts. Oversight over implementing acts would be relatively weak, with committee opinions largely advisory, while delegated acts would confer substantial flexibility, allowing the Commission to adjust key financial parameters without prior legislative approval. Project evaluation, similarly, would shift from rule-based, expert-driven assessment to a possible discretionary executive judgment, further consolidating the European Commission’s authority. Ex post safeguards, such as parliamentary or Council objections and judicial review, would remain largely reactive and insufficient to counterbalance this concentration of power, particularly given the limited practical use of the control mechanisms provided for under Article 290 TFEU.[215] In this respect and consistent with the initial diagnosis, this instrument is embedded in a broader trajectory of EU governance characterised by what has been described as ‘executive dominance and parliamentary side-lining which have plagued European governance since the Eurocrisis’.[216]
4. Conclusion
The ECF proposal marks not merely a continuation of the incremental strengthening of the European executive, but a structural reorientation of the EU institutional framework. What began as a pragmatic response to external, economic or geopolitical pressures has evolved into a more stable governance paradigm, where the European Commission assumes a central and quasi-political executive role.
This transformation is driven by the institutionalisation of a dual logic of flexibility and centralisation within the EU’s budgetary architecture. Through broad policy windows, reallocable financial envelopes, and a governance system structured around work programmes and advisory bodies, the proposed framework enables the Commission to steer priorities, reallocate resources, and shape implementation modalities across the entire investment chain. While this design enhances responsiveness and coordination, it also introduces significant legal and operational uncertainties, including risks of overlaps between the ECF, Horizon Europe and InvestEU, as well as challenges related to transparency and traceability.
In this regard, the issue does not lie in a formal breach of the principle of institutional balance. The functions conferred by the Treaties remain, in principle, respected. Rather, the proposal exposes the limits of this principle in capturing how power is exercised in practice. Flexibility and efficiency, initially conceived as administrative tools, have become structural drivers of legislative design, expanding executive discretion without a corresponding adaptation of accountability mechanisms.
This evolution carries institutional consequences. Under the proposal, the advisory model would replace examination procedures as the default rule, diminishing Member State and Council controls. Delegated acts are framed in broad terms, granting the European Commission the capacity to alter key financial parameters. Evaluation committees, once bastions of technocratic independence, are reconfigured to allow for the selective inclusion of experts, entrenching the Commission’s discretion. Yet, ongoing negotiations suggest that neither the European Parliament nor the Council are likely to acquiesce easily to this recalibration of institutional roles, both defending their prerogatives against a framework that would further strengthen the Commission’s procedural dominance.
Moreover, while centralisation is not inherently problematic, its legitimacy depends on the extent to which it is effectively framed and subjected to meaningful scrutiny. A more integrated and flexible budgetary system can enhance efficiency and strategic coherence, provided that it is accompanied by robust safeguards ensuring transparency, traceability, and democratic oversight. The risk arises when flexibility and speed are prioritised without a corresponding reinforcement of accountability structures. In this respect, the ECF proposal can be understood as embodying a model of centralised executive discretion, in which flexibility and catalytic funding logic enable the Commission to shape strategic priorities with limited ex ante constraint and only partial ex postcontrol. Given that the legislative proposal for the ECF is still at the stage of discussion, we suggest five reforms.
First, the semantic architecture of the future financial programme should explicitly reaffirm the respect for institutional competencies alongside flexibility. The language of urgency and efficiency must be balanced by renewed emphasis on transparency and accountability.
Second, procedural safeguards should be strengthened. The advisory procedure in comitology ought to be replaced by the examination procedure as the standard rule for all programmes exceeding defined thresholds of financial significance. Delegated acts should be narrowly circumscribed, confined to genuinely non-essential elements, or, where possible, eliminated. Evaluation committees should be clearly composed of experts appointed transparently by Parliament and Member States.
Third, the Commission should clarify the ECF’s architecture by defining precise interactions between the ECF, Horizon Europe and InvestEU. This clarification would include quantified objectives for policy windows, mandatory monitoring rules to prevent overlaps and double funding, and explicit performance criteria for financial instruments such as InvestEU’s revolving capacity.
Fourth, the European Parliament should gain more power over annual ECF work programmes and policy window reallocations, converting its current consultative role into binding scrutiny. This would anchor executive flexibility within democratic oversight, preventing the Commission from unilaterally shaping strategic priorities through implementing acts. Such reform aligns with ongoing calls for parliamentary empowerment in flexible budgetary instruments.
Fifth, the European Court of Auditors should be more involved in the ECF policy windows and InvestEU safeguards review, with a follow-up on identified risks such as revolving capacity and double funding prevention.
These reforms would re-embed executive discretion within a renewed framework of constitutional accountability, ensuring that efficiency serves, rather than supplants, legality and legitimacy. The challenge ahead is not to reverse the rise of the European executive but to ensure that its authority is exercised within a structure that respects the division of competences and preserves the autonomy of the other institutions.
Despite these five possible reforms, this study enables us to take our analysis of the European institutional system a step further by highlighting a structural mismatch between the formal architecture of EU law and the practical dynamics of executive power. While the principle of institutional balance remains formally respected, it proves ill-equipped to capture the contemporary reality in which the Commission exercises extensive discretion in the allocation of EU funding with limited effective accountability. The Treaties organise the allocation of competences but only weakly constrain their exercise. Consequently, institutional balance operates primarily as a safeguard of formal roles, while largely leaving unaddressed the substantive risks associated with the intensity and autonomy of executive action. In this light, the principle retains normative significance but offers only limited analytical traction unless complemented by a closer focus on the legal and procedural constraints governing the exercise of discretion.
If institutional balance remains confined to the framework previously established, and the national concepts of separation of powers or checks and balances cannot be used, it raises the question of how the interplay of power between EU institutions might evolve in practice. In this context, it can be inferred from the analysis developed in this paper that the path proposed by the Commission in its proposal for EU budgetary governance is a model of centralised executive discretion, where flexibility and catalytic logic enable the Commission to steer strategic priorities with minimal procedural constraints and limited legislative oversight. Whether interinstitutional negotiations will redirect this trajectory toward stronger accountability, or entrench executive predominance as the EU’s new constitutional normal, remains the defining challenge for the Union’s institutional future.
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European Papers, Vol. 11, 2026, No 2, pp. 1051-1088
ISSN 2499-8249 - doi: 10.15166/2499-8249/902
* PhD researcher, Université Libre de Bruxelles (Centre for European Law), julien.debande@ulb.be.
[1] Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Art 312; A Schout, L Molthof and S Hollander, ‘The Multiannual Financial Framework. The Search for Flexibility and Recognised Effectiveness’ (Clingendael Report, 2023), at www.clingendael.org 9.
[2] M Sapala, ‘Strengths and Weaknesses of the EU Budget Flexibility “toolbox”’ in B Laffan, A De Feo (eds), EU Financing for Next Decades (European University Institute 2020) 254.
[3] P Leino-Sandberg and T Saarenheimo, ‘Discretion, Economic Governance and the (New) Political Commission’ in J Mendes (eds), EU Executive Discretion and the Limits of Law (Oxford University Press 2019) 147.
[4] M Patrin, ‘New Structure, New Priorities: Why the Next Commission May Be More Hierarchical but less Coherent’ (Verfassungsblog, 15 October 2024), at verfassungsblog.de.
[5] European Parliament, ‘MFF 2028-2034: ITRE Aspects to Consider’ (2025) Briefing Requested by the ITRE Committee, at www.europarl.europa.eu 1.
[6] European Commission Proposal COM(2025) 555 final/2 for a regulation of 16 July 2025 of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the European Competitiveness Fund (‘ECF’), including the specific programme for defence research and innovation activities, repealing Regulations (EU) 2021/522, (EU) 2021/694, (EU) 2021/697, (EU) 2021/783, and amending Regulations (EU) 2021/696, (EU) 2023/588, (EU) [EDIP], Art 4(2)(b) to (e).
[7] European Parliament (n 5) 3.
[8] European Commission, ‘EUROPE’S BUDGET. An Ambitious Budget for a Stronger Europe 2028-2034’ (European Commission, September 2025), at commission.europa.eu; F Micheletti and A Van Den Hove, ‘A Vague European Competitiveness Fund’ (Politico, 13 January), at pro.politico.eu.
[9] Proposal COM(2025) 555 final/2 (n 6) Recitals 3 and 13, and Arts 3 and 12.
[10] F Ohnsorge, M Raiser and ZL Xie, ‘The Renaissance of Industrial Policy: Known Knowns, Known Unknowns, and Unknown Unknowns’ (World Bank Blogs, 29 October 2024), at blogs.worldbank.org.
[11] Proposal COM(2025) 555 final/2 (n 6) Art 3.
[12] Ibid Art 5.
[14] European Parliament (n 5) 7.
[15] Sapala (n 2) 254.
[16] R Crowe, ‘The European Council and the Multiannual Financial Framework’ (2016) 18 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 69, 72; Business Europe, ‘Squaring the (Budgetary) Circle – Proposals on the 7th MFF (2028-2034)’ (2025) Position Paper, at www.businesseurope.eu 4.
[17] TFUE Art 312(1).
[18] TFUE Arts 311 and 314.
[19] TFUE Art 312(2); Regulation EU, Euratom 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast), Arts 14–17; Council Regulation EU, Euratom 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027, Arts 4–7.
[20] TFUE Art 312(3); Council Regulation 2020/2093 (n 19) Arts 11–12.
[21] TFUE Art 312(2); Council Regulation 2020/2093 (n 19) Art 8.
[22] Regulation 2024/2509 (n 19) Arts 12–16; S Saurel, Le budget de l’Union européenne (Documentation française 2018) 89–95; S Mazur, ‘Annual EU Budgetary Procedure. Introduction to the Steps in the European Parliament’ (2024) EPRS Briefing, at www.europarl.europa.eu 2.
[23] TFUE, Art 312; MW Bauer, JD Graham and S Beckert, ‘The EU Budget System after Lisbon: How the European Parliament Lost Power and how it may Compensate (somewhat) for It’ (2015) 13 Zeitschrift für Staats- und Europawissenschaften 479, 481; M Kölling and J Hernández-Moreno, ‘The Multiannual Financial Framework 2021–2027 and Next Generation EU - A Turning Point of EU Multi-Level Governance?’ (2024) 23 Journal of Contemporary European Studies 459, 467.
[24] Sapala (n 2) 262.
[25] M Busse, H Lin, M Nabar and J Yoo, ‘Making the EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework Fit for Purpose’ (IMF Working Paper, WP/25/114), at www.imf.org 4; R Hansum, J Lindner, N Redeker and E Rubio, ‘What’s in the EU Budget Proposal and What Should Come Next’ (2025) Policy Brief, at www.delorscentre.eu 11.
[26] European Parliament, ‘The EU’s post-2027 long-term Budget: Opening Statements by Marie BJERRE, Danish Minister for European Affairs, and Piotr SERAFIN, European Commissioner for Budget, Anti-Fraud and Public Administration’ (2025) Council and Commission statements.
[27] Facilitating the financing of investments and reforms to boost European competitiveness and creating a Capital Markets Union (Draghi Report) [2025] 2024/2116(INI), 10 September 2025; European Parliament (n 5) 7.
[28] Proposal COM(2025) 555 final/2 (n 6) Recital 2; European Parliament, ‘Multi-annual Financial Framework beyond 2027 and Own Resources: Opening Statements by Johan VAN OVERTVELDT (ECR, BE), Chair of BUDG and by Piotr SERAFIN, Commissioner for Budget, Anti-Fraud and Public Administration - BUDG Committee’ (2025) Opening statements.
[29] European Parliament, ‘Press Conference by Siegfried MUREŞAN (EPP, RO) and Carla TAVARES (S&D, PT), Co-rapporteurs, on Parliament’s priorities on MFF ahead of Commission proposal’ (2025) Press Conference.
[30] European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on Budgetary Discipline, on Cooperation in Budgetary Matters and on Sound Financial Management’, COM(2025) 572 final, 10.
[31] Proposal COM(2025) 555 final/2 (n 6) Recitals 2, 4, 16, 17, 41, 50, 65 and 82; European Commission, ‘Study Supporting the Impact Assessment on a Competitiveness Fund for the Next MFF’ (European Union, 2025) 109–127 and 189–211; European Commission, ‘Commission staff working document Impact Assessment Report on the European Competitiveness Fund’, SWD(2025) 555 final.
[32] C Kreuder-Sonnen, ‘Beyond Integration Theory: The (Anti-)Constitutional Dimension of European Crisis Governance’ (2016) 54 Journal of Common Market Studies 1350, 1352.
[33] Proposal COM(2025) 555 final/2 (n 6) Recitals 63 and 66, and Arts 15(6) and 20; S Saurugger and F Terpan, ‘Integration through (Case) Law in the Context of the Euro Area and Covid-19 Crises: Courts and Monetary Answers to Crises’ (2020) 42 Journal of European Integration 1161, 1163.
[34] S Saurugger and F Terpan, ‘The Court of Justice of the European Union, Conflicts of Sovereignty and the EMU Crisis’ (2019) 41 Journal of European Integration 903, 905.
[35] This analysis adheres to the theory of constitutional balance, which encompasses institutional balance, substantive balance, and spatial balance, see M Dawson and F de Witte, ‘Constitutional Balance in the EU after the Euro-Crisis’ (2013) 76 The Modern Law Review 817, 818; R Dehousse and P Magnette, ‘L’évolution du système institutionnel’ in R Dehousse (eds), Politiques européennes (Presses de Sciences Po 2009) 35.
[36] O Moskalenko, ‘The Institutional Balance. A Janus-Faced Concept of EU Constitutional Law’ (2016) 45 Politeja 125, 130.
[37] S Platon, ‘The Principle of Institutional Balance. Rise, Eclipse and Revival of a General Principle of EU Constitutional Law’ in K Ziegler, P Neuvonen and V Moreno-Lax (eds), Research Handbook on General Principles of EU Law (Edward Elgar Press 2022) 136.
[38] R Schütze, European Constitutional Law (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2021) 77.
[39] A Sbragia, ‘Conclusion to the Special Issue on Institutional Balance and the Future of EU Governance: The Treaty of Nice, Institutional Balance and Uncertainty’ (2002) 15 Governance 403.
[40] T Dubowski, ‘The Institutional Balance as CJEU’s Contribution to Democracy in the Union’ in E Kuzelewska and others (eds), European Judicial Systems as a Challenge for Democracy (Intersentia 2017) 29. For an opposite view, see S Prechal, ‘Institutional Balance: A Fragile Principle with Uncertain Contents’ in NM Blokker, T Heukels and MMTA Brus (eds), The European Union after Amsterdam: A Legal Analysis (Kluwer Law International 1998) 275–278.
[41] Case 9-56 Meroni & Co., Industrie Metallurgiche, SpA v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, EU:C:1958:7; B De Witte, ‘Institutional Principles: A Special Category of General Principles of E.C. Law’ in U Bernitz and J Nergelius (eds), General Principles of European Community Law (Kluwer Law International 2000) 156; F Le Bot, ‘Le principe de l’équilibre institutionnel en droit de l’Union européenne’ (DPhil thesis, Université Paris 2 Panthéon-Assas 2012) 22-272.
[42] J-P Jacqué, ‘The Principle of Institutional Balance’ (2004) 41 Common Market Law Review 383. For an opposite view, see K Lenaerts, ‘A New Institutional Equilibrium? In Search of the “Trias Politica” in the European Community’ in C Engel and W Wessels (eds), From Luxembourg to Maastricht. Institutional Change in the European Community after the Single European Act (Europa Union Verlag 1992) 139 and M Chamon, EU Agencies: Legal and Political Limits to the Transformation of the EU Administration (Oxford University Press 2016) 268.
[43] M Chamon, ‘The Institutional Balance, an Ill-Fated Principle of EU Law’ (2015) 21 European Public Law 371, 375.
[44] Consolidated version of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), Arts 13–19; Case C-70/88 European Parliament v Council of the European Communities, EU:C:1990:217; P Koutrakos, ‘Institutional Balance and Sincere Cooperation in Treaty-Making under EU law’ (2019) 68 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 5.
[45] Case C-133/06 European Parliament v Council of the European Union, EU:C:2008:257; LAJ Senden, ‘Soft Law and its Implications for Institutional Balance in the EC’ (2005) 2 Utrecht Law Review 79, 90.
[46] Case 25/70 Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel v Köster and Berodt & Co, EU:C:1970:115; S Artaud-Vignollet, ‘Le Principe de l’équilibre institutionnel dans l’Union européenne’ (DPhil thesis, Université des Sciences Sociales Toulouse 1-2003) 42.
[47] K Lenaerts and A Verhoeven, ‘Institutional Balance as a Guarantee for democracy in EU Governance’ in C Joerges and R Dehousse (eds), Good Governance in Europe’s Integrated Market (Oxford University Press 2001) 47.
[48] Artaud-Vignollet (n 46) 49.
[49] Schütze (n 38) 80; V Velyvyte, ‘The Power to Shape the Internal Market. Implications of the CJEU Case Law for the EU’s Institutional Balance’ (2016) 12 Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy 25, 33.
[50] P Craig, ‘Democracy and Institutional Structure. Past, Present and Future’ (2018) 4 Revista Romana de Drept European 23, 27; N de Sadeleer, Manuel de droit institutionnel et de contentieux européen (Bruylant 2025) 216.
[51] Y Devuyst, ‘The European Union’s Institutional Balance after the Treaty of Lisbon: Community Method and Democratic Deficit Reassessed’ (2008) 39 Georgetown Journal of International Law 247, 323; D Lassalle and N Levrat, ‘Un triangle à quatre côtés: l’équilibre institutionnel et le conseil Européen’ (2004) 26 Journal of European Integration 431, 439.
[52] D Johnson, ‘The Institutional Balance as an Agent of Transformation in the EU Constitutional Order: Reconciling the Simultaneous Rise of the European Parliament and European Agencies’ (2017) 6 Cambridge International Law Journal 202, 207; T Christiansen, ‘The European Union after the Lisbon Treaty: An Elusive “Institutional Balance”’ in A Biondi, P Eeckhout and S Ripley (eds), EU Law After Lisbon (Oxford University Press 2012) 233.
[53] L Cram, ‘Introduction to Special Issue on the Institutional Balance and the Future of EU Governance’ (2002) 15 Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions 309, 319.
[54] European Commission, ‘European governance - A white paper’, COM(2001) 428 final.
[55] V Delhomme and T Hervey, ‘The European Union’s Response to the Covid-19 Crisis and (the Legitimacy of) the Union’s Legal Order’ (2022) 41 Yearbook of European Law 48, 81; C Molinari, ‘The EU Readmission Policy to the Test of Subsidiarity and Institutional Balance: Framing the Exercise of a Peculiar Shared Competence’ (2022) 7 European Papers 151, 154.
[56] A Fritzsche, ‘Discretion, Scope of Judicial Review and Institutional Balance in European Law’ (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 361, 385; E Vos, ‘The Rise of Committees’ (1997) 3 European Law Journal 210, 223.
[57] D Curtin, Executive Power of the European Union (Oxford University Press 2009) 65.
[58] D Curtin, ‘Accumulated Executive Power in Europe. The “Most Dangerous” Branch of Government in the European Union’ (2008) 71 Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen - Mededelingen van de Afdeling Letterkunde, Nieuwe Reeks, at ssrn.com 23-24; Devuyst (n 51) 318; B Smulders and K Eisele, ‘Reflections on the Institutional Balance, the Community Method and the Interplay between Jurisdictions after Lisbon’ (2012) 31 Yearbook of European Law 112, 114.
[59] T Chopin, ‘Vers un véritable pouvoir exécutif européen: de la gouvernance au gouvernement’ (2013) Fondation Robert Schuman Policy Paper, at www.robert-schuman.eu 5.
[60] Curtin (n 57) 91; K Lenaerts, ‘Some Reflections on the Separation of Powers in the European Community’ (1991) 28 Common Market Law Review 11, 13.
[61] TFEU, Art 288.
[62] Curtin (n 57) 75.
[63] P Craig, ‘European Governance: Executive and Administrative Powers under the New Constitutional Settlement’ (2005) 3 International Journal of Constitutional Law 407, 410; A Burgin, ‘Intra- and Inter-Institutional Leadership of the European Commission President: An Assessment of Juncker’s Organizational Reforms’ (2018) 56 Journal of Common Market Studies 837, 841.
[64] Curtin (n 57) 72.
[65] TEU, Art 17; M Costa and S Peers, EU Law (15th ed., Oxford University Press 2023) 36; S Hix, The Political System of the European Union (Palgrave Macmillan 2005) 32; T Warren, ‘The European Parliament and the Eurozone Crisis: An Exceptional Actor?’ (2018) 20 British Journal of Politics and International Relations 632, 633.
[66] Curtin (n 58) 16.
[67] Ibid 15.
[68] Ibid 14; KM Johansson and J Tallberg, ‘Explaining Chief Executive Empowerment: EU Summitry and Domestic Institutional Change’ (2010) 33 West European Politics 208, 215.
[69] P Poguntke and P Webb, The Presidentialisation of Politics. A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies (Oxford University Press 2005).
[70] F Fabbrini, ‘Funding the War in Ukraine: The European Peace Facility, the Macro‐Financial Assistance Instrument, and the Slow Rise of an EU Fiscal Capacity’ (2023) 11 Politics and Governance 52, 56; P Genschel and M Jachtenfuchs, ‘More Integration, Less Federation: The European Integration of Core State Powers’ (2016) 23 Journal of European Public Policy 42, 45; Y Miadzvetskaya, ‘EU Sanctions Decision-Making in Times of War: Procedural Changes and Rise of the Commission’ (2025) 32 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 269, 275.
[71] Curtin (n 58) 18.
[72] TFEU, Arts 310–312; P Craig and G de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (8th edn, Oxford University Press 2024) 67.
[73] TFEU, Arts 287 and 319.
[74] TEU, Art 17; TFEU, Arts 318–319; E Berry, B Bogusz, M Homewood and S Strecker, Complete EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (5th edn, Oxford University Press 2022) 33.
[75] Saurel (n 22) 111–121; European Court of Auditors, Annual Report 2024 (2025), at www.eca.europa.eu.
[76] TFEU, Arts 313–316.
[77] D Curtin and M Egeberg, ‘Tradition and Innovation: Europe’s Accumulated Executive Order’ (2008) 31 Western European Politics 639, 649; M Egeberg, ‘European Government(s). Executive Politics in Transition?’ (2007) 31 West European Politics 235, 236.
[78] TFEU, Arts 17(1) and 296; Saurel (n 22) 111–121.
[79] F Vibert, The Rise of the Unelected. Democracy and the New Separation of Powers (Cambridge University Press 2007) 129.
[80] P Craig, ‘Institutions, Power and Institutional Balance’ (Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper 48-2011), at ssrn.com 62; MW Bauer and S Becker, ‘The Unexpected Winner of the Crisis: The European Commission’s Strengthened Role in Economic Governance’ (2014) 36 Journal of European Integration 213, 226.
[81] D-I Anches, ‘The Issue of the European Governance’ (2016) 1 Cross-Border Journal for International Studies 7, 16; O Costa and N Brack, How the Eu Really Works (2nd edn, Routledge 2018) 55; B Crum, ‘Saving the Euro at the Cost of Democracy’ (2013) 51 Journal of Common Market Studies 614, 619.
[82] A Salla, The Euro Crisis 2010-2014. The Changing Role of the European Commission (European Union 2018) 79.
[83] D Curtin, ‘The European Union and Executive Power’ in D Patterson and A Södersten (eds), A Companion to European Union Law and International Law (John Wiley & Sons 2016) 110.
[84] R Dehousse, ‘Why has EU Macroeconomic Governance Become more Supranational?’ (2016) 38 Journal of European Integration 617, 622.
[85] M Patrin, ‘Governance by Funding. NGEU, Solidarity and the EU institutional Balance’ (REBUILD Centre Working Paper 4-2023), at ssrn.com 5.
[86] P Leino-Sandberg and M Ruffert, ‘Next Generation EU and its Constitutional Ramifications: A Critical Assessment’ (2022) 59 Common Market Law Review 433, 437.
[87] D Bokhorst and F Corti, ‘Governing Europe’s Recovery and Resilience Facility: Between Discipline and Discretion’ (2024) 59 Government and Opposition 718, 721.
[88] M Dawson and F de Witte, ‘From Balance to Conflict: A New Constitution for the EU’ (2016) 22 European Law Journal 204, 206; M Kordeva, ‘Le principe d’équilibre des pouvoirs appliqué à la structure institutionnelle de l’Union européenne et ses effets sur le principe constitutionnel de séparation des pouvoirs’ (2020) 53230 Revue générale du droit online, at www.revuegeneraledudroit.eu.
[89] Art 122(2) TFEU; Saurel (n 22) 111–121.
[90] Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility, Arts 18–24.
[91] Craig (n 80) 79; Patrin (85) 16.
[92] D Fromage and M Markakis, ‘The European Parliament in the Economic and Monetary Union after COVID: Towards a Slow Empowerment?’ (2022) 28 The Journal of Legislative Studies 385, 389; M Patrin, ‘The European Commission Between Institutional Unity and Functional Diversification: The Case of Economic Governance’ (2021) 6 European Papers 269.
[93] B Crum, ‘Parliamentary Accountability in Multilevel Governance: What Role for Parliaments in Post-crisis EU Economic Governance?’ (2018) 25 Journal of European Public Policy 268, 280; C Fasone, ‘European Economic Governance and Parliamentary Representation. What Place for the European Parliament?’ (2014) 20 European Law Journal 164, 173.
[94] Regulation 2021/241 (n 90) Art 24; S Gustavsson and others, ‘Examining the Illusion of Accountability’ in S Gustavsson, C Karlsson and T Persson (eds), The Illusion of Accountability in the European Union (Routledge 2009) 6.
[95] C Shore, ‘“European Governance” or Governmentality? The European Commission and the Future of Democratic Government’ (2011) 17 European Law Journal 287, 291; A-S Dumitru, ‘Does the European Governance Strengthen as a Result of the Reform Process Adopted by the Treaty of Lisbon?’ (2020) 14 Europolity: Continuity & Change in European Governance 81, 90.
[96] A Akbik, The European Parliament as an Accountability Forum. Overseeing the Economic and Monetary Union (Cambridge University Press 2022) 97; Curtin (n 57) 248.
[97] JB Cruz, ‘Unstable Structures. The Institutional Balance and the European Court of Justice’ in M Dawson, B de Witte and E Muir (eds), Revisiting Judicial Politics in the European Union (Edward Elgar 2024) 154.
[98] P Lévy and N Berghmans, ‘The European Competitiveness Fund: Will it Fulfill Europe’s Clean Transition Ambitions?’ (2025) Issue Brief IDDRI Sciences Po, at www.iddri.org 2.
[99] Jarlebring (n 13) 8.
[100] I Begg and others, ‘The Next Revision of the Financial Regulation and the EU Budget Galaxy. How to Safeguard and Strengthen Budgetary Principles and Parliamentary Oversight’ (2022) Study Requested by the BUDG committee, at www.europarl.europa.eu 24.
[101] Proposal COM(2025) 555 final/2 (n 6) Recital 49; European Commission, ‘Study Supporting the Impact Assessment on a Competitiveness Fund for the Next MFF’ (European Union 2025) 25 and 161–188.
[102] Proposal COM(2025) 555 final/2 (n 6) Recital 18, and Arts 1 and 2(14).
[103] Jarlebring (n 13) 8; M Chamon, ‘The EU’s Dormant Economic Policy Competence: Reliance on Article 122 TFEU and Parliament’s Misguided Proposal for Treaty Revision’ (2024) 49 European Law Review 166, 179.
[104] Proposal COM(2025) 555 final/2 (n 6) Art 4.
[105] Ibid Art 3.
[106] European Court of Auditors, ‘The EU’s Financial Landscape. A Patchwork Construction Requiring further Simplification and Accountability’ (2023) Special Report, at www.eca.europa.eu 14; R Crowe, ‘The European Budgetary Galaxy’ (2017) 13 European Constitutional Law Review 428.
[107] Proposal COM(2025) 555 final/2 (n 6) Explanatory Memorandum.
[108] Ibid Art 4.
[109] European Parliament (n 5) 6.
[110] Proposal COM(2025) 572 final (n 30) 10.
[111] Proposal COM(2025) 555 final/2 (n 6) Art 7.
[112] European Parliament (n 5) 6.
[113] European Court of Auditors, ‘Opinion 01/2026 on the European Competitiveness Fund’ (2026), at www.eca.europa.eu 14–16.
[114] Full integration under the ECF covers InvestEU, European Space Programme (ESP), European Defence Fund (EDF), Digital Europe Programme (DEP), LIFE, EU4Health, Union Secure Connectivity (USC) – IRIS2, European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP), Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) and European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA). Partial integration applies to the Digital Component of the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) and the SME Component of the Single Market Programme (SMP).
[115] Proposal COM(2025) 555 final/2 (n 6), Recitals 11 and 53; European Court of Auditors (n 113) 35; European Parliament (n 5) 5.
[116] European Court of Auditors (n 113) 10–11 and 21.
[117] L Resende Carvalho, ‘From Fragmentation to Strategy: Building a Smart European Competitiveness Fund’ (2025) Policy Brief Bertelsmann Stiftung, at bst-europe.eu 4.
[118] Proposal COM(2025) 555 final/2 (n 6), Art 4; European Court of Auditors (n 113) 7.
[119] European Commission, ‘Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing Horizon Europe, the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, for the period 2028-2034 laying down its rules for participation and dissemination, and repealing Regulation (EU) 2021/695’, COM(2025) 543 final, Art 6; European Parliament (n 5) 1 and 5.
[120] Proposal COM(2025) 543 final (n 119) Recital 15, and Arts 16 and 20; Hansum, Lindner, Redeker and Rubio (n 25) 6.
[121] Proposal COM(2025) 555 final/2 (n 6) Recital 15; M Draghi, ‘The Future of European Competitiveness. Part A | A Competitiveness Strategy for Europe’ (2024) Report, at commission.europa.eu (Draghi Report).
[122] Proposal COM(2025) 555 final/2 (n 6) Art 21; Jarlebring (n 13) 8.
[123] European Parliament (n 5) 4; European Parliament Resolution of 7 May 2025 on a revamped long-term budget for the Union in a changing world [2025] 2024/2051(INI).
[124] Jarlebring (n 13) 8.
[125] European Court of Auditors (n 113) 11.
[126] Proposal COM(2025) 555 final/2 (n 6) Arts 1 and 2(14).
[127] Carvalho (n 117) 2.
[128] European Court of Auditors (n 113) 18–20; S Morris and HS Shin, ‘Catalytic Finance: When Does it Work?’ (2006) 70 Journal of International Economics 161.
[129] Proposal COM(2025) 555 final/2 (n 6) Recitals 71–75 and Art 12(6).
[130] Ibid Art 3.
[131] Ibid Art 1(17).
[132] Jarlebring (n 13) 8.
[133] Proposal COM(2025) 555 final/2 (n 6) Art 8.
[134] Ibid Recital 47.
[135] A similar external investment mobilisation mechanism can be observed in the Global Gateway, see GM Pérez Vico and T Pelletier, ‘Unpacking the Global Gateway’s Financial Structure: A Critical Look at the Development Logic’ (2025) Natolin Policy Papers Series, at www.coleurope.eu 10.
[136] European Court of Auditors (n 113) 14–16.
[137] European Commission, ‘A Dynamic EU Budget for the Priorities of the Future: The Multiannual Financial Framework 2028–2034’, COM(2025) 570 final/2.
[138] Proposal COM(2025) 555 final/2 (n 6) Recital 12.
[139] Communication COM(2025) 570 final/2 (n 137); European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’, COM(2025) 30 final, 24; European Court of Auditors (n 113) 12–14.
[140] Proposal COM(2025) 555 final/2 (n 6) Art 14(2).
[141] Ibid Art 14(4).
[142] Ibid Art 14.
[143] Ibid Arts 14(5) and 14(8).
[144] Ibid Art 14(9).
[145] European Parliament (n 5) 7.
[146] European Court of Auditors (n 113) 21.
[147] Ibid 22.
[148] European Parliament (n 5) 6; Micheletti and Van Den Hove (n 8).
[149] This technique, central to the proposal, emerged at a time when Member States were the primary actors responsible for implementing and enforcing EU law.Initially, the Council could authorise the European Commission to exercise executive powers, a practice that gave rise to the system of comitology. Building on the approach, this system enabled the Commission to implement EU law while being assisted and supervised by committees composed of national experts. See T Kroll, ‘Delegated Legislation and Implemented Legislation and the Institutional Balance of the European Union’ (2011) 66 Zeitschrift fur Offentliches Recht (ZoR): Journal of Public Law 253, 257, and D Finke and J Blom Hansen, ‘Contested Comitology? The Overlooked Importance of the EU Commission’ (2022) 29 Journal of European Public Policy 891, 894.
[150] C Buchanan, ‘The Conferral of Power to the Commission Put to the Test’ (2014) 5 European Journal of Risk Regulation 267, 272; B de Witte, ‘The Dividing Line Between Delegated and Implementing Acts, Part Two: The Court of Justice Settles the Issue in Commission v. Parliament and Council (Visa reciprocity)’ (2015) 52 Common Market Law Review 1617, 1632.
[151] Case C-427/12 European Commission v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, EU:C:2014:170; C Blumann, ‘Le système normatif de l’Union européenne vingt ans après le traité de Maastricht’ (2012) 19 Revue des affaires européennes 235, 256.
[152] TA Borzel, ‘From EU Governance of Crisis to Crisis of EU Governance: Regulatory Failure, Redistributive Conflict and Eurosceptic Publics’ (2016) 54 Journal of Common Market Studies 8, 10.
[153] Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on Better Law-Making, OJ L123/1, 26–28.
[154] C Fontan, ‘Riders on the Delegated Act Storm: Power Struggles and Expertise in the Dismantling of the EU Taxonomy’ (2025) Journal of European Public Policy, at doi.org 8.
[155] T Christiansen and M Dobbels, ‘Comitology and Delegated Acts after Lisbon: How the European Parliament Lost the Implementation Game’ (2012) 16 European Integration online Papers, at eiop.or.at 13.
[156] M Chamon, The European Parliament and Delegated Legislation (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2022). The Taxonomy Regulation can exemplify these risks because of its broad delegation to the Commission, which has sparked debate over politicised technical assessments and limited control during implementation (see point 96 et seq. of Case T-625/22 Austria v Commission, EU:T:2025:869). For further discussion, see CV Gortsos and D Kyriazis, ‘The Taxonomy Regulation and Its Implementation’ in D Busch, G Ferrarini and S Grünewald (eds), Sustainable Finance in Europe. Corporate Governance, Financial Stability and Financial Markets (Springer 2024) 521.
[157] P Craig, ‘Delegated Acts, Implementing Acts and the New Comitology Regulation’ (2011) 36 European Law Review 671, 674; R Schütze, ‘“Delegated Legislation” in the (New) European Union: A Constitutional Analysis’ (2011) 74 The Modern Law Review 661, 669.
[158] P Craig, ‘Delegated and Implementing Acts’ in R Schutze and T Tridimas (eds), Oxford Principles of European Union Law, Volume I: The European Union Legal Order (Oxford University Press 2018) 721; see TFEU, Art 291(3), which stated that the prerequisite for this act is that the European Parliament and the Council, ‘acting by means of regulations in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall lay down in advance the rules and general principles concerning control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers’.
[159] Proposal COM(2025) 555 final/2 (n 6) Recitals 86 and 87.
[160] Ibid Art 15(1).
[161] Ibid Recital 50, and Art 15.
[162] Jarlebring (n 13) 13.
[163] Council Decision (EU) 2021/764 of 10 May 2021 establishing the Specific Programme implementing Horizon Europe – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, and repealing Decision 2013/743/EU, Arts 13(2)(a) and 14(3).
[164] Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers, Arts 4 and 12; Proposal COM(2025) 555 final/2 (n 6) Arts 15(3) and 84(4).
[165] Ibid Arts 13(2)(b), 13(2)(c) and 14(4); Regulation (EU) 2021/694 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the Digital Europe Programme and repealing Decision (EU) 2015/2240, Art 31; Regulation (EU) 2021/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing the Connecting Europe Facility and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1316/2013 and (EU) No 283/2014, Art 24; Regulation (EU) 2021/690 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing a programme for the internal market, competitiveness of enterprises, including small and medium-sized enterprises, the area of plants, animals, food and feed, and European statistics (Single Market Programme) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 99/2013, (EU) No 1287/2013, (EU) No 254/2014 and (EU) No 652/2014, Arts 3(2)(b), 16(2) and 21(5).
[166] Regulation (EU) 2021/522 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 March 2021 establishing a Programme for the Union’s action in the field of health (‘EU4Health Programme’) for the period 2021-2027, and repealing Regulation (EU) No 282/2014, Art 23; Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the European Defence Fund and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1092, Art 34; Regulation (EU) 2021/696 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing the Union Space Programme and the European Union Agency for the Space Programme and repealing Regulations (EU) No 912/2010, (EU) No 1285/2013 and (EU) No 377/2014 and Decision No 541/2014/EU, Arts 100 and 107(3); Regulation (EU) 2023/1525 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 July 2023 on supporting ammunition production (ASAP), Art 16; Regulation (EU) 2023/2418 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 October 2023 on establishing an instrument for the reinforcement of the European defence industry through common procurement (EDIRPA), Art 16; Regulation (EU) 2023/588 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2023 establishing the Union Secure Connectivity Programme for the period 2023-2027, Arts 41 and 47(3); European Commission, ‘Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Defence Industry Programme and a framework of measures to ensure the timely availability and supply of defence products (‘EDIP’)’, COM(2024) 150 final, Art 58.
[167] Regulation 182/2011 (n 164) Art 5.
[168] Proposal COM(2025) 555 final/2 (n 6) Art 83.
[169] Christiansen and Dobbels (n 155) 10.
[170] Proposal COM(2025) 555 final/2 (n 6) Art 3(2), 15(3) and 15(4). As regards the committee structure, and in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011, this would apply horizontally through the ECF General Committee for matters concerning the general objectives or matters concerning more than one of the specific objectives, to the Clean Transition and Industrial Decarbonisation window in the configuration of the Clean Transition Committee, to the Health, Biotechnology, Agriculture and Bioeconomy window in the configuration of the Health, Biotech, Agriculture and Bioeconomy Committee, to the Digital Leadership policy window in the configuration Digital Committee, and to the Resilience and Security, Defence Industry and Space policy window through the Defence Industry Committee, Resilience Committee, Space Committee, and Security Industry Committee. The advisory procedure also applies to horizontal activities under Chapter III relating to ‘Project Advisory, SME Collaboration, skills development and Access to Funding’, see Proposal COM(2025) 555 final/2 (n 6) Arts 3(2)(a–d) and 83(1)(a–h). For further detail, see Arts 83(6) and (7), which provide for the possible establishment of sub-committees for the Clean Transition Committee and the Security Industry Committee, and stipulate that third countries, international organisations, or other EU institutions, bodies, and agencies may be invited as observers in each committee
[171] Proposal COM(2025) 555 final/2 (n 6) Recital 87.
[172] Ibid Art 83(2).
[173] Ibid Recital 87, and Art 83(3); Jarlebring (n 13) 14. This would apply more precisely, for acts relating to European Defence Projects of Common Interest, rules and provisions relating to GOVSATCOM and IRIS² governmental services, in the context of Secure Connectivity, rules and provisions relating to the inclusion, operational and access requirements, and technical specifications for SST services, in the context of Space Surveillance and Tracking, provisions concerning Space Weather Events services, including relevant technical requirements, in the context of Space Weather Events, and general security requirements applicable to each component, see Proposal COM(2025) 555 final/2 (n 6) Arts 45(2), 61(6)–(10) – Paragraph 10 refers to ‘paragraphs 9 to 12’, but it is presumed that this is a drafting error by the Commission and that the intended reference is to paragraphs 6 to 9, 62(3), (8) and (10), 64(4) and 77(3).
[174] This would apply for measures required to establish and regulate access policies for PNT data and services, measures relating to the determination of the location of ground-based infrastructure, ensuring sound financial management and the protection of security and public order of the EU and its Member States, technical specifications and EOGS eligible actions, in the context of Earth Observation, and provisions complementing the catalogue of services and defining the technical and operational requirements for the implementation and evolution of components and services under Chapter VII, after consultation with users and stakeholders where necessary, in the context of support for resilience, security, defence industry and space, See Proposal COM(2025) 555 final/2 (n 6) Arts 59(5), 60(5)(d) and (9), 75 (4) and (5),
[175] In detail, it is the criteria defining how an entity may exercise decisive influence over a legal entity in a way that affects the security, integrity and resilience of EU operational space systems, while also taking into account the objective of promoting the EU’s strategic autonomy in key technologies and value chains, see Proposal COM(2025) 555 final/2 (n 6) Art 69(4).
[176] In detail, it would be, first, triggered if a work programme has not been adopted by 1 October of the year preceding the year of budget implementation, allowing the European Commission to adopt the work programme by means of immediately applicable implementing acts, which remain in force for the period of budget implementation, and, second, applied in response to crises or other exceptional and duly substantiated emergencies, where immediate action is necessary, see Proposal COM(2025) 555 final/2 (n 6) Recital 88, and Art 15(5) and (6).
[177] The Commission also inconsistently cites provisions throughout the proposal, for example, alternately referring to ‘Article 83(2)’ and ‘Article 83, paragraph 2’, which may risk misleading the reader.
[178] Proposal COM(2025) 555 final/2 (n 6) Recital 49, and Art 9.
[179] Ibid Recital 57, and Art 14(11).
[180] Ibid Art 21(4).
[181] Ibid Arts 6 and 12.
[182] Regulation (EU) 2021/695 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing Horizon Europe – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, laying down its rules for participation and dissemination, and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1290/2013 and (EU) No 1291/2013, Arts 28(1) and 29(1); Regulation (EU) 2021/523 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 March 2021 establishing the InvestEU Programme and amending Regulation (EU) 2015/1017, Art 24; European Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/856 of 26 February 2019 supplementing Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to the operation of the Innovation Fund, Art 12; Regulation 2021/694 (n 165) Art 21.
[183] Proposal COM(2025) 555 final/2 (n 6) Recital 43.
[184] Ibid Art 12(9).
[185] Ibid Art 51(19).
[186] European Parliament (n 5) 6.
[187] European Court of Auditors (n 113) 16–17.
[188] Craig (n 80) 77.
[189] TFEU, Art 288; Craig (n 80) 78; M Chamon, ‘Institutional Balance and Community Method in the Implementation of EU Legislation following the Lisbon Treaty’ (2016) 53 Common Market Law Review 1501, 1505.
[190] TFEU, Art 290(1); Case C-355/10 European Parliament v Council of the European Union, EU:C:2012:516; R Schütze, ‘Constitutionalism and the European Union’ in S Peers and C Barnard (eds), European Union Law (4th edn, Oxford University Press 2023) 89.
[191] M Chamon, The European Parliament and Delegated Legislation: An Institutional Balance Perspective (Hart Publishing 2022) chs 4 and 5.
[192] CF Bergström, Comitology: Delegation of Powers in European Union and the Committee System (Oxford University Press 2005) 209; J-P Jacqué, ‘L’éternel retour. Réflexions sur la comitologie’ in G Vandersanden and A De Walsche (eds), Mélanges en hommage à Jean-Victor Louis (Éditions de l’ULB 2003) 205; H Kortenberg, ‘Comitologie: le retour’ (1998) 34 Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen 317, 320.
[193] Proposal COM(2025) 555 final/2 (n 6) Art 60(6).
[194] Ibid Art 62(4).
[195] Ibid Art 60(7).
[196] Ibid Art 21(7).
[197] Ibid Art 21(3).
[198] Craig (n 80) 78.
[199] European Commission, ‘Commission Decision of 30.5.2016 establishing horizontal rules on the creation and operation of Commission expert groups’, C(2016) 3301 final; European Commission, ‘Communication to the Commission framework for Commission Expert Groups: Horizontal rules and public register’, C(2016) 3300 final.
[200] European Union Council, ‘Common Understanding on Delegated Acts’ doc. 8640/11; J-P Jacqué, ‘Droit institutionnel de l’Union européenne’ (2014) 50 Revue trimestrielle de droit européen 765, 774.
[201] S Thiery, Les actes délégués en droit de l’Union européenne (Bruylant 2020) 95.
[202] Proposal COM(2025) 555 final/2 (n 6) Art 84(4).
[203] Chamon (n 189) 1530.
[204] Thiery (n 201) 359.
[205] Commission, ‘European governance - A white paper’, COM(2001) 428 final; Commission, ‘For the European Union: peace, freedom, solidarity - Communication of the Commission on the institutional architecture’, COM(2002) 728 final; Proposal for a Council Decision Amending Decision 1999/468/EC laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission, COM(2002) 719 final/2.
[206] Case C‑696/15 P Czech Republic v European Commission, EU:C:2017:595; Thiery (n 201) 411.
[207] Proposal COM(2025) 555 final/2 (n 6) Art 84(2).
[208] TFEU, Art 290; Regulation 182/2011 (n 164) Arts 3–6; European Union Council, ‘Common Understanding on delegated acts’ doc. 8640/11; Le Bot (n 41) 409.
[209] Proposal COM(2025) 555 final/2 (n 6) Art 84(3).
[210] Ibid Art 84(6).
[211] Ibid Art 84(5).
[212] V Marissen, ‘The European Parliament and EU Secondary Legislation: Improved Scrutiny Practices and Upstream Involvement for Delegated Acts and Implementing Acts’ in O Costa (eds), The European Parliament in Times of EU Crisis (Palgrave Macmillan 2001) 143.
[213] D Ritleng, ‘The Dividing Line between Delegated and Implementing Acts: The Court of Justice Sidesteps the Difficulty in Commission v. Parliament and Council (Biocides)’ (2015) 52 Common Market Law Review 243, 252.
[214] Thiery (n 201) 129.
[215] M Pari and S Pradier, ‘EU Budget 2028-2034’ (2025) EPRS Briefing, at www.europarl.europa.eu 12–15.
[216] P Dermine, ‘Article 122 TFEU and the Future of the Union’s Emergency Powers’ (EU Law Live, 2024), at eulawlive.com.