What Food Sovereignty? Assessing the New French Food Sovereignty Law Against the Common Agricultural Policy’s Objectives

Table of Contents: 1. Introduction. – 2. What is food sovereignty? Origins and evolution. – 3. The CAP’s compatibility with Food Sovereignty principles. – 4. Food sovereignty in the French law. – 5. Discussion. – 5.1. The evolving semantics of ‘food sovereignty’. – 5.2. The exercise of national policy space under EU law. – 5.3. Between alignment and friction: The French law vs. the CAP. – 6. Final remarks.

Abstract: While initially popularised by grassroots organisations, the concept of food sovereignty is now increasingly used as a slogan by certain Member States of the European Union (EU).Notably, France has given concrete form to its political ambitions with the adoption of a new Orientation law on ‘food sovereignty and the renewal of generations in agriculture’ in March 2025. This paper analyses the meaning of food sovereignty as defined in this new law, and explores the connections and tensions between the French ambitions in the agri-food sector and the wider EU legal framework within which French law operates, focusing on the aims of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). In particular, we propose three avenues for discussion. We first argue that the meaning of food sovereignty as defined by the French Orientation law deviates from its original meaning as understood by grassroots organisations. We then argue that the Orientation law uneasily operates in a restricted EU agri-food legal framework, which leaves little room for policy innovation at the national level. We finally contend that, due to this constrained legal framework, and despite the flexibility allowed by the 2023 CAP reform, the French political priorities, to a certain extent, appear closely aligned with the EU agri-food policy and legal goals. By situating the French case within broader debates on the institutionalisation of food sovereignty and the evolving balance between national autonomy and supranational constraints in CAP governance, the paper clarifies how national claims to food sovereignty interact with and test the post-2023 CAP framework.

Keywords: food sovereignty – Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) – 2023 CAP reform – EU agri-food law – national policy space – French Orientation law.

1.   Introduction

In recent years, the concept of ‘food sovereignty’ has gained increasing political traction within the European Union (EU). Notably, in 2022, Italy and France incorporated ‘food sovereignty’ into the titles of their respective ministries for agriculture,[1] signalling its growing institutional relevance. More recently, Hungary identified this concept as one of the priorities for its presidency of the Council for the period ranging from July to December 2024.[2]

This growing popularity around food sovereignty has been legally formalised in France, which has promulgated an Orientation law on ‘agricultural sovereignty and generational renewal in agriculture’ in March 2025.[3] While the use of the term ‘food sovereignty’ in French law is not new,[4] this new Orientation Law offers for the first time an extensive definition of the concept in French legislation. By defining food sovereignty through a list of 24 objectives,[5] the recently adopted Orientation Law is arguably the national legal framework of the EU that most comprehensively defines food sovereignty.[6]

Despite this increased interest in food sovereignty at national level, the concept has been contested for many years at the EU level. The original meaning of food sovereignty, as proposed by peasant organisations in the 1990s, prioritises local, small-scale agricultural production and emphasises self-sufficiency, democratic control, and resilience of local food systems.[7] In contrast, the EU’s agri-food governance has historically been shaped by the supranational rules of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) – the EU’s legal framework governing agriculture through subsidies – which has disproportionately benefited larger farms and agribusinesses over small-scale farms.[8] This imbalance is particularly evident in the CAP’s system of direct payments, which allocates support largely based on the size of agricultural landholdings, thereby favouring large-scale producers and reinforcing structural inequalities in the sector. In this context, claims of food sovereignty by EU Member States – with their explicit emphasis on local autonomy, democratic control, and cultural appropriateness –[9] have often been met with caution by the EU institutions, if not outright scepticism.[10] This is mainly due to the strong nationalist connotations of this concept and its perceived potential to fragment EU solidarity and undermine the harmonised rules of the internal market.

However, food sovereignty is no longer solely a claim advanced by certain Member States: it is now progressively being invoked by the EU itself, signalling a potential shift in the discourse and institutional framing of EU agri-food governance. In its most recent agri-food policy communication published in February 2025,[11] the European Commission explicitly embraces the concept of ‘food sovereignty’, framing it as a central objective of EU agri-food policy and a guiding principle for the Union’s future strategic orientation in this domain. This evolving policy framework is further characterised by the enhanced discretion afforded to Member States in the implementation of the CAP, as introduced by its most recent reform. This allows national authorities to tailor CAP instruments to context-specific priorities, while also allowing for the adoption of complementary agri-food policies that pursue distinct or additional objectives beyond the CAP’s formal scope. 

While these priorities may appear to stand in tension with the CAP’s traditionally supranational logic, the renationalisation embedded in the 2023 reform invites a reassessment of the dichotomy between the EU’s inherently ‘common’ – by definition – agricultural objectives and the nationalist tendencies of domestic agricultural legislation. This shift reflects not merely a procedural decentralisation but a deeper recalibration of authority and ambition in EU agri-food governance. In this evolving landscape, national initiatives, particularly those explicitly invoking the language and aims of food sovereignty, warrant close scrutiny, as they may either complement or directly challenge the CAP’s foundational principles and its evolving objectives. As such, comparing the CAP’s traditional, market-oriented model with the principles underpinning food sovereignty provides critical insights into potential tensions and complementarities between EU-wide and nationally driven agri-food policy agendas.

Over time, European agricultural and food policies have moved away from supporting national interpretations of food sovereignty and are now progressively oriented toward reinforcing food sovereignty at the Union level. This evolution appears consistent with the broader legal and institutional architecture of the EU, as European food and agricultural law is fundamentally shaped by the harmonised rules of the internal market and the policy objectives enshrined in the EU Treaties.

In this context, this paper investigates whether a national law, specifically, the recently proposed French legislation on food sovereignty, can coexist with, or even complement, the binding objectives and rules of the CAP. Alternatively, it considers whether such a development signifies a paradigmatic shift toward a greater renationalisation, potentially challenging the coherence and uniformity of EU-wide agri-food policy and legal objectives. To address these concerns, the paper explores the following research question: To what extent does the newly adopted French law on food sovereignty align with, or diverge from, the goals of the CAP? 

First, in order to place the definition of food sovereignty into context, we conduct a literature review on this evolving concept (section 2). Then, we analyse the CAP’s compatibility with this concept (section 3). In the subsequent sections, we describe how food sovereignty is addressed and defined in the newly adopted French law (section 4) and discuss it in light of the CAP’s objectives (section 5). Lastly, we conclude our contribution with final remarks (section 6).

2.   What is food sovereignty? Origins and evolution

Although food sovereignty has initially been a political project put forward by grassroots movements, some States and institutions have now appropriated the concept, redefining it within the framework of their own policies and legal systems. This section first outlines the historical and political genesis of the term ‘food sovereignty’ and its evolution through transnational advocacy networks. It then examines how the concept has acquired legal meaning in international, EU and national legislation, and explores the implications of this shift for agri-food governance within the EU.

The concept of ‘food sovereignty’ is rooted in the social and agrarian grassroots movements in Latin America that emerged in response to neoliberal economic agri-food policies of the 1980s and 1990s.[12] These policies, particularly the inclusion of agriculture in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and subsequent negotiations under the World Trade Organisation (WTO), promoted the liberalization of agri-food trade, which in turn threatened the existence of small-scale farmers worldwide.[13]In this context, social and agrarian grassroots movements founded La Via Campesina in 1993,[14] upholding food sovereignty as a political project at the international level.[15] The concept was first formally articulated during the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) World Food Summit in Rome in 1996,[16] where it emerged as a deliberate alternative to food security.[17]

However, today, food sovereignty is invoked by a diverse range of actors, extending well beyond its original association with grassroots movements. Depending on the actors involved and the specific socio-political contexts in which it is invoked, it is subject to varying interpretations. Environmental organisations, for instance, may interpret food sovereignty differently from socio-economic development organisations, which, in turn, may have a different understanding of it compared to policymakers.[18] As a result, food sovereignty is widely recognised as a contested and evolving concept in the literature.[19] While its meaning has been continuously shaped and refined through sustained activism, scholarly debate, and grassroots mobilisation, the 2007 Nyéléni Declaration[20] is widely regarded as the most authoritative and broadly accepted articulation of the concept.[21] In the Nyéléni Declaration, food sovereignty is described as ‘the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their right to define their own food and agriculture systems’.[22] The Declaration further characterizes food sovereignty as a model prioritising local, peasant and family farmer-driven agriculture, artisanal fishing, and pastoralist-led grazing practices.[23]

Advocates of ‘food sovereignty’ regard it not merely as a complement to ‘food security’ but as its necessary precondition, arguing that food security can only be achieved through the principles and practices enshrined in food sovereignty.[24] The concept of ‘food security’ has been adopted since the 1970s[25] by international organisations such as the United Nations (UN) affiliated organisations and the EU. The UN FAO considers that food security ‘exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food which meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life’.[26] The EU endorses this definition of food security and has recently integrated a ‘sustainability’ component to it.[27]

Despite the widespread use of ‘food security’ in the discourse of international organisations and the EU, it has been increasingly critiqued for failing to address deeper issues of power relations, access, and control within food systems. Notably, critics argue that food security, though essential, often fails to consider who produces food, under what conditions, and for whose benefit.[28] These concerns were initially voiced and progressively sharpened through international gatherings of peasant organisations, which demanded food transformation at the international level. Over time, wider groups have made food sovereignty a discourse of their own as an alternative to the dominant food security discourse.[29]

While food sovereignty’s meaning is undoubtedly disputed, it has nonetheless been incorporated into law. In international law, food sovereignty is considered a ‘right-based’ concept,[30] which encompasses several rights such as the right to access food, produce food, use land and resources, and live in dignity.[31] Food sovereignty emphasises local control over food systems and asserts that individuals and communities should have the ability to determine the methods and sources of food production and distribution within their regions. In this context, some scholars have discussed the relationship between food sovereignty and the right to food, emphasising that food sovereignty can be seen as a framework that enables the realisation of the right to food by promoting sustainable agricultural practices and local control over food systems.[32]

At the international level, food sovereignty was officially recognised as a right in 2018 by the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas (UNDROP), attributing this right to ‘peasants and other people working in rural areas’.[33] While endorsed by grassroots movements such as La Via Campesina,[34] the non-binding nature of UNDROP poses a challenge for its implementation. Yet, UNDROP refers to various human rights enshrined in international law such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),[35] the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),[36] the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,[37] and several International Labour Organization Conventions.[38] In practice, UNDROP provisions have been used in several court cases in conjunction to other international and national legal instruments to interpret international human rights standards.[39]

Therefore, while discussions around food sovereignty often draw on, critique, or expand the dominant food security framework, the two concepts rest on different normative foundations: food security focuses on access and availability, whereas food sovereignty emphasises control, agency, and the power relations governing food systems.

Throughout the world, many non-EU countries have integrated the concept of food sovereignty into their laws and policies,[40]including in their Constitutions.[41] This trend can be observed in a growing number of nation-states, such as Venezuela, Senegal, Mali, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Nepal, and Bolivia, where food sovereignty has become a foundational principle guiding national agricultural and food policy.[42]

Conversely, food sovereignty does not explicitly appear in any EU law. Rather, it occasionally surfaces in EU institutional discourse, particularly in non-binding policy documents. When referring to food sovereignty, the EU institutions specifically refer to the EU’s collective capacity to ensure the security and resilience of its food system, rather than endorsing national food sovereignty. For instance, in response to the war provoked by Russia on Ukrainian territory in 2022, the European Committee of the Regions emphasized its support ‘to enhance the EU’s food sovereignty and achieve greater autonomy by encouraging regional and local diverse food production.’ The war revealed the EU’s structural dependence on external inputs and markets, particularly cereals, vegetable oils, fertilisers, and energy, exposing vulnerabilities in the resilience of its food supply chains.[43] As global prices spiked and food supply routes were disrupted, EU institutions increasingly invoked EU food sovereignty to signal the need to strengthen the Union’s collective capacity to ensure stable and secure food supplies to reduced reliance on geopolitical hotspots. Similar calls have been made by the European Parliament[44] and the European Economic and Social Committee.[45] While the European Commission has also moderately promoted an ‘EU food sovereignty’,[46] it firmly stands against any narrative on Member States’ national food sovereignty, which could encourage protectionist measures favouring domestic food products, with the risk of infringing EU law, notably Articles 34 and 35 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). This position reflects the Commission’s commitment to preserving the integrity of the EU internal market, where the free movement of goods and the prevention of trade barriers remain fundamental principles.[47]

While national food sovereignty is clearly discouraged under EU law, the concept of EU food sovereignty is gaining increasing prominence within the European Commission’s latest agri-food policy. Notably, in its February 2025 ‘Vision for Agriculture and Food’,[48] the Commission refers to ‘food sovereignty’ no fewer than eight times. These references suggest a discursive shift, indicating a broader reconfiguration of EU strategic priorities in light of recent geopolitical and environmental challenges. In the policy document, the Commission affirms that European food security, safety, and food sovereignty are ‘non-negotiable’[49] and explicitly positions food sovereignty as an integral component of the EU’s broader security, competitiveness, and sustainability agenda.[50] It further acknowledges that the EU’s current food sovereignty is heavily dependent on imported inputs, such as fertilisers, animal feed, and energy, often sourced from geographically concentrated regions.[51] Reducing these strategic dependencies and mitigating supply chain vulnerabilities are thus presented as key priorities, particularly in the context of the EU’s transition to a low-carbon, resource-efficient economy. Moreover, the Commission highlights the importance of plant breeding innovations, including the use of biotechnological tools such as New Genomic Techniques (NGTs), as key to developing climate-resilient, resource-efficient, nutritious, and high-yielding crop varieties. These innovations are framed as fundamental to enhancing both food security and food sovereignty within the EU.[52]

However, it is essential to recognise that while the Commission has embraced the discourse of food sovereignty, its interpretation remains distinct from the grassroots and more nationalist-driven vision associated with movements like La Via Campesina. The EU’s Vision, which prioritises strategic autonomy and competitiveness, situates food sovereignty within a broader framework of economic and security concerns. At the same time, the integration of food sovereignty within the EU’s policy framework presents significant challenges when considered within the broader international legal system. A key tension arises between the rights of States to regulate agricultural policies in line with food sovereignty principles and the constraints imposed by international trade, which tend to prioritise liberalisation, non-intervention, and market-driven approaches. Ultimately, the Commission’s evolving stance suggests that food sovereignty, though not fully aligned with its traditional conception in other parts of the world, is becoming an increasingly relevant and strategic concept within the EU’s agri-food policy.

3.   The CAP’s compatibility with Food Sovereignty principles

Building on this evolving policy landscape, it becomes essential to examine how the concept of food sovereignty interfaces with the EU’s core agricultural policy framework: the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). While the European Commission’s recent references to food sovereignty mark a rhetorical shift, a closer look at the CAP reveals how, and to what extent, this influential policy instrument supports or undermines the principles associated with food sovereignty. The following section explores the relationship between the CAP and food sovereignty, assessing the policy’s potential – and limitations – in advancing such approach within the EU. This analysis also lays the groundwork for addressing the central research question of this paper.

Before delving into the relationship between food sovereignty and the CAP, it is first necessary to situate the agri-food sector within its broader European legal context, established by the EU Treaties. These Treaties lay down, in particular, the rules governing the ability of both the EU institutions and Member States to legislate on agri-food matters. Agriculture is an area of shared competence between the EU and its Member States, as outlined in Article 4(2)(d) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). In this domain, both the EU and national governments may legislate and adopt legally binding acts. However, when the EU exercises its competence, it takes precedence, precluding Member States from enacting conflicting national measures unless expressly permitted. This division of powers reflects the hybrid nature of the CAP, which is at once a central pillar of EU integration and a policy area deeply embedded in national political, economic, and territorial interests of individual Member States. The exercise of shared competence in agriculture is not confined to the CAP alone. Member States may also adopt agri-food legislation outside the implementation of the CAP stricto sensu, provided that such measures comply with EU internal market rules, competition law, and do not undermine the objectives or functioning of the CAP. This creates an opportunity for national innovation in agricultural and food policy, particularly in areas where EU law is silent, permissive, or broadly framed, as illustrated by the French case study.

The CAP provides a structured framework that defines how agricultural funding is allocated and justified, anchoring Member States’ actions within a shared set of goals and principles. The core objectives of the CAP are set out in Article 39 of the TFEU, and include the aims to increase agricultural productivity, ensuring a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, stabilising markets, assuring the availability of supplies, and ensuring that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices. Conceived in the aftermath of World War II – a period marked by food shortages and economic instability – the CAP was designed to address pressing concerns around food security, economic recovery, and rural development. Its foundational goals reflect a dual focus: enhancing agricultural productivity and self-sufficiency and securing fair economic conditions for those working in the sector. The emphasis on productivity and market stabilisation was intended to boost efficiency, increase output with fewer resources, and mitigate price fluctuations, thereby ensuring a stable supply of agricultural goods.[53] At the same time, the CAP prioritises safeguarding farmers’ livelihoods and guaranteeing consumers access to food at low and stable prices.[54]

While increasingly subject to a ‘renationalisation’ process,[55] the CAP is still an ‘EU business’: it is managed and funded at the EU level from the resources of the EU’s budget, accounting for approximately 40% of its total expenditure.[56] However, while the CAP has traditionally operated under a broad, standardised approach to agricultural support and rural development across Member States, recent reforms indicate a shift in its operational dynamics. The 2023 CAP[57] introduces a more flexible and tailored delivery model, moving away from a uniform application of policy to a more performance-based approach.[58] This shift reflects a broader recognition of the diverse context-specific needs of individual Member States, allowing for more targeted support.[59]

This new model transitions from merely evaluating compliance with procedural requirements to focusing on the assessment of performance and outcomes. Member States are required to achieve the CAP’s objectives through their respective National Strategic Plans (NSP). While the core objectives of the CAP have remained unchanged through successive reforms, the policy has progressively evolved to address new and emerging challenges. Aligned with the broader objectives of the European Green Deal (EUGD),[60] the 2023 CAP incorporates ten specific objectives that expand upon the original core objectives outlined in Article 39 TFEU. These objectives address environmental, social, and economic dimensions of sustainability, extending beyond traditional focuses on productivity and self-sufficiency to include generational renewal, healthy diets, landscape protection, and knowledge sharing.[61] Through each NSP, each Member State outlines its national strategic priorities, and measures for agricultural policy, aiming to achieve targets that go beyond the CAP core objectives, and aligning with the broader goals set by the EU. 

Historically, the CAP’s centralised and market-oriented design has limited the incorporation of food sovereignty principles within its regulatory framework. In contrast, the concept of food security has steadily gained prominence in both policy discourse and legal texts. This is exemplified by the 2023 CAP Strategic Plans Regulation, which explicitly affirms that the CAP ‘should keep ensuring food security, which should be understood as meaning access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food at all times’.[62]

This growing divergence in emphasis between food security and food sovereignty reflects deeper ideological and policy tensions within the EU agri-food governance framework. While EU institutions continue to prioritise food security through (mostly) centralised mechanisms aimed at stability, safety, and market efficiency, non-governmental organisations such as La Via Campesina, along with a growing body of academic scholarship, challenge this approach by advocating for food sovereignty.[63]

From this perspective, food sovereignty is not merely a complement to food security, but a transformative alternative – one that seeks to fundamentally reshape food systems by shifting power to local communities, prioritising ecological sustainability, and challenging the dominance of global market forces.[64] In contrast to the trade-oriented food security model, which focuses on global market access and efficiency, food sovereignty emphasises self-determination and local control. Despite recent reforms, the CAP largely continues to reflect this trade-oriented approach, promoting competitive export agriculture, market liberalisation, and a technocratic vision of food governance.[65] This contrast underscores the need to assess how, and to what extent, the CAP can accommodate such alternative visions.

When assessed through the lens of food sovereignty, the CAP’s objectives both align with and diverge from its principles. Food sovereignty advocates for the right of communities to control their food systems, emphasising local production, sustainability, and agroecology.[66] This framework provides a critical lens for evaluating the CAP’s alignment with more decentralised and equitable agricultural models. While several of the CAP’s objectives resonate with the overarching goals of food sovereignty, such as promoting sustainable resource management,[67] halting biodiversity loss,[68] and fostering rural development,[69] the policy’s predominant reliance on market-driven mechanisms and industrial agriculture often conflicts with the core tenets of food sovereignty. For instance, the CAP Strategic Plans Regulation sets out the aim to support viable farm incomes and enhance resilience in the agricultural sector –[70] a goal that, in principle, aligns with the food sovereignty objective of ensuring economic stability for farmers. However, this aim is typically pursued within a framework that favours large-scale, export-oriented agricultural systems, which risks undermining the diversity, autonomy, and local control that are central to food sovereignty. In particular, instruments such as hectare-based payments[71] tend to disproportionately benefit larger farms, reinforcing structural inequalities and sidelining small-scale, diversified producers. Similarly, the CAP’s focus on enhancing market orientation, competitiveness, and technological innovation, including research and digitalisation,[72] stands in tension with the food sovereignty critique of agricultural industrialisation. While the CAP promotes an efficiency-oriented, technology-intensive model, food sovereignty advocates instead call for agricultural systems grounded in local knowledge, agroecological practices, and diversified farming. This contrast reflects fundamentally different visions for the future of agriculture, with food sovereignty prioritising sustainability, cultural relevance, and farmer autonomy over productivity and global market integration.

The CAP’s objective to improve the farmers’ position in the value chain[73] presents a potential alignment with food sovereignty’s call for greater economic justice. However, the CAP continues to support structures that disproportionately benefit large agribusinesses over smallholder farmers, thus limiting the scope for genuine empowerment and local control. Despite the introduction of measures aimed explicitly at smaller operations - such as the Complementary Redistributive Income Support for Sustainability (CRISS),[74] which requires the redistribution of direct payments from larger to smaller or medium-sized holdings offering higher per-hectare payments on the first hectares, and the optional Small Farmers Scheme,[75] which provides a flat-rate payment for small farmers in lieu of full compliance requirements - these instruments remain under-utilised and under-funded.[76] Member States often cap CRISS payments at modest levels, and only a minority have adopted the Small Farmers Scheme, whose ceiling (€1,250) pales in comparison to direct payments received by larger holdings. As a result, smallholders receive only a fraction of total CAP outlays even though they account for over half of all European farms.[77] This imbalance not only perpetuates scale-based inequities but also limits the financial resilience and decision-making autonomy of those producers most closely aligned with the principles of food sovereignty.

Furthermore, while the CAP’s focus on climate change mitigation, carbon sequestration, and resource conservation[78] reflects an environmental ethos shared by food sovereignty, these goals are often pursued through voluntary and loosely coordinated measures left to Member States, notably via eco-schemes.[79] Although eco-schemes provide payments per hectare for adopting environmentally friendly practices, their design and implementation vary widely across Member States, often favouring large-scale producers with greater capacity to comply.[80] This fragmented approach risks marginalising smallholders, who may face barriers to participation due to limited resources or administrative complexity, thereby reducing their ability to benefit from or contribute meaningfully to environmental objectives. As a result, the CAP’s environmental ambitions, while commendable, do not always translate into equitable support for small-scale farmers or genuine local stewardship, underscoring ongoing tensions between the policy’s stated goals and the realities of its implementation. This approach has drawn criticism for failing to adapt to local ecological and social realities.[81] The continued promotion of industrial agricultural models, characterised by large-scale monocultures, high external input use (such as synthetic fertilisers and pesticides), intensive livestock production, and vertically integrated supply chains, recently reaffirmed in the Commission’s latest Vision for Agriculture and Food, further undermines the CAP’s potential to support the ecological and socio-political transformation envisioned by food sovereignty advocates.

In terms of rural development, the CAP’s focus on attracting young farmers, promoting gender equality, and fostering employment in rural areas[82] aligns with the objectives of food sovereignty, which include social justice and inclusivity. However, food sovereignty envisions a deeper transformation in governance structures, advocating for more localised, participatory decision-making processes in food systems. While the CAP addresses issues of social inclusion, through measures such as support for young farmers, gender equality initiatives, and rural development programs targeting vulnerable communities, it does so within a highly centralised and bureaucratic framework that often limits the extent of local autonomy and decision-making power. For instance, NSP must align with EU-wide objectives and indicators,[83] leaving limited room for communities to define priorities that reflect their specific social, cultural, or territorial contexts. Lastly, the CAP’s emphasis on high-quality, sustainable food production and reducing food waste[84] aligns with food sovereignty’s ethical framework; yet, the persistent dominance of industrial farming practices raises concerns about the efficacy of these measures in achieving the more radical goals of food sovereignty.[85]

The CAP continues to push for intensification and mechanisation of production, with minimal interventions promoting small farmers’ roles in food supply chains and a lack of concrete measures and measurable objectives in their support.[86] While the new specific objectives of the CAP address a broad range of societal demands, including sustainable agricultural production, healthier nutrition, social inclusion and local development in rural areas, any reference to the concept of food sovereignty is neglected in the legal text. The integration of this concept in the CAP may, in fact, exacerbate the decentralisation and renationalisation process of the policy to such an extent that reconciling the ‘common’ character of the policy with its core Treaty objectives, and with the principles underpinning food sovereignty, emerges as an increasingly complex and contested challenge.

Therefore, while the CAP’s new objectives reflect some alignment with the principles of food sovereignty, particularly in the areas of environmental sustainability and social inclusion, the policy’s reliance on market-driven, industrial agriculture remains a significant point of divergence. A recent and notable example of how food sovereignty principles are being taken up at the national level, outside the framework of the CAP, can be seen in France’s new food sovereignty law. This development offers a valuable opportunity to assess how national legislation may both align with and challenge the EU’s common objectives, particularly in light of the CAP’s evolving focus on sustainability and subsidiarity.

4.   Food sovereignty in the French law

In April 2024, the French government proposed a draft Orientation law on ‘agricultural sovereignty and generational renewal in agriculture’,[87] aiming at establishing agricultural and food sovereignty as a the strategic priority within national public policies, which was promulgated in March 2025.[88] Far from being an ordinary legal measure, French Orientation laws are a special type of law aiming to set out guiding or orientation principles in law and policy, such as political objectives. They are considered ‘Programming laws’ under Article 34, twenty-first paragraph of the French Constitution.[89] Due to their broad provisions, Programming laws typically require the adoption of additional implementing measures to ensure their effective operationalisation.[90] Orientation laws in the agri-food sector have been adopted by the French legislator since 1960,[91] and the latest one, promulgated in March 2025, is now the seventh law of this kind.

This new law, announced by French President Emmanuel Macron in September 2022, is the result of several stakeholders and public consultations carried out by the French government since 2022.[92] It has been proposed in a particularly heated social context following a series of farmers’ demonstrations across Europe, including in France.[93] The explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law highlights several contextual factors underpinning its adoption, including the COVID-19 health crisis, the war of invasion led by Russia in Ukraine, and climate change impacts.[94] Against this backdrop, the French government asserts the need to ‘strengthen’[95] both national and European food sovereignty, framing this objective as one of the ‘strategic priorities’[96] of French public policies.

This strategic prioritisation of food sovereignty is reflected in the structure of the adopted law, which dedicates its first title, entitled ‘Regaining France’s Food Sovereignty’ to defend its fundamental interests to this objective.[97] The concept of food sovereignty is primarily articulated in Title I of the law; accordingly, the following analysis will focus on the provisions contained within this section.

In particular, Article 1 places a great emphasis on the concept of food sovereignty in French agricultural policy, and amends the Preliminary Section of the French Rural and Maritime Fishing Code, which sets out the aims of French policies on agriculture, food and maritime fishing. Prior to the new Orientation law, ‘food sovereignty’ was only mentioned four times by the French Rural and Maritime Fishing Code and was defined in vague and general terms. Following the reform, it is now referenced fourteen times in the first Articles of the Preliminary Section, accompanied by a significantly expanded and more detailed legal definition.[98]

Although already introduced in French law in 2014,[99] food sovereignty is now given a greater political importance and a more precise meaning with the new Orientation law, prompting three observations. First, food sovereignty is placed at the centre of the political priorities of French agriculture law by introducing in the first Article of the Rural and Maritime Fishing Code[100] the provision that ‘The protection, enhancement and development of agriculture and fishing are of major general interest, insofar as they guarantee the nation’s food sovereignty. They are of fundamental interest to the nation as essential elements of its economic potential’.[101] By claiming that the ‘protection, enhancement, and development of agriculture and fishing’ are ‘essential elements’ of the nation’s ‘economic potential’, it emphasises the role of national food production in boosting the country’s economic growth.

Second, for the first time in French law, an exhaustive definition of food sovereignty is provided. Food sovereignty is defined as ‘maintaining and developing the nation’s capacity to produce, process and distribute the agricultural and food products needed to ensure that the entire population has access to a healthy diet, and supporting export capacities that contribute to global food security’.[102] By focusing on the role of the nation to provide food to the whole population and food exportation, this definition aligns with the common meaning of ‘food security’.[103] This definition thus reframes the concept of food sovereignty by focusing on food consumption while omitting the role of (local) producers and communities in food production, an element that remains central to the understanding of food sovereignty as advocated by grassroots organisations.

Third, the law of orientation further details the political priorities and aims of French agricultural policies, which are designed to ensure food sovereignty. In particular, five overarching political priorities are set out: 

-       ‘Ensuring the long-term viability and attractiveness of agriculture, as well as the renewal of its generations of workers, by facilitating the installation, transfer and takeover of farms’;[104]

-       ‘Ensuring the Nation’s food safety and health, within the framework of food policy’;[105]

-       ‘Ensuring a high level of competitiveness for agriculture’;[106]

-       ‘Supporting research and innovation, in particular to promote climate and environmental transformation in agriculture’;[107]

-       ‘Ensuring fair remuneration for agricultural workers’.[108]

These five priorities are further detailed into twenty-four aims. We propose to classify these aims into six distinct categories, each reflecting a distinct policy orientation. Each category, which we will examine below, comprises a set of similar objectives that share a common theme, namely: 1) ensuring a similar level playing field between French agri-food products and non-EU ones in the global market; 2) guaranteeing consumers’ rights to access adequate and nutritious food; 3) addressing environmental concerns; 4) ensuring health protection; 5) ensuring the socio-economic viability of farming and territorial cohesion; 6) and fostering food literacy and empowering consumers. We categorise these six sets of objectives in the below table (Table 1).

Table 1. Overview of the objectives defining food sovereignty in the French Orientation law

This long list of aims, which together define the French conception of ‘food sovereignty’, prompts a number of observations. First, the law makes very few references to food sovereignty’s values as understood by peasant organisations. Grassroots movements have consistently emphasised the right of peoples to define their own food and agriculture systems, prioritising smallholder autonomy, agroecology, and the central role of local communities in shaping food production and distribution. The only aims which seem to align with these values are the ones referring to ensuring a fair remuneration to a number of actors involved in food production, recognising the role of women, and the promotion of short supply chains.[133] Instead, the concept of ‘food sovereignty’ as operationalised in the law is more closely linked to a set of objectives that reflect broader State priorities, such as economic resilience, technological innovation, and national security. This indicates a shift in emphasis from food sovereignty as a people-centred, transformative paradigm to one primarily oriented around safeguarding national agricultural capacity and boosting productivity. As such, the French version of food sovereignty appears to reflect a state-led reinterpretation of the concept, with only partial alignment with the emancipatory goals advocated by grassroots actors.

Second, from a food production perspective, these aims revolve around the need to protect France’s food production capacity in a context of globalised trade, while complying with its international and European obligations. In particular, the stated aim is to encourage continued food production in France to reduce its dependence on certain products, and to protect French farmers from anti-competitive practices. However, this does not imply protectionism tout-court, as the aims clearly stress the need to continue exporting products, while ensuring the country’s production capacities.

Third, although the aims are formally framed as contributing to the achievement of France’s food sovereignty, the law also simultaneously reflects a conceptual and ideological alignment with the paradigm of food security. For instance, one of these aims stresses the need to ‘Guaranteeing food security to ensure that the entire population has access to sufficient, healthy, safe, diversified and nutritious food throughout the year, and to help fight food insecurity’[134] and to ‘Responding to demographic growth, by rebalancing terms of trade between countries within a European framework and international cooperation based on respect for the principle of food sovereignty […]’.[135]

Fourth, this combination of ideals of food sovereignty and food security in the law make the aims of the law rather ambiguous. The law for example provides the aim of ‘promoting fruit and vegetable sovereignty’, which echoes the other aim of ‘Promoting the European Union’s and France’s protein autonomy by setting a national target of 10% of used agricultural area cultivated with legumes by 1 January 2030, and achieving national protein autonomy by 2050’.[136] This understanding of food sovereignty may trigger the question of whether achieving ‘protein autonomy’ or ‘fruit and vegetable sovereignty’ would lead to reducing trade between France and other non-EU countries for certain food products. In this context, food sovereignty may be interpreted primarily as France’s capacity for self-sufficiency in the production of certain foods, a notion that could, at first glance, resonate with the understanding of food sovereignty advocated by peasant organisations. However, when these objectives are examined alongside others that are more clearly grounded in the food security paradigm, the coherence of this interpretation becomes less certain. The emphasis on self-sufficiency risks being decoupled from the broader principles of democratic control over food systems, social justice, and ecological sustainability that define food sovereignty in its grassroots conceptualisation. This raises important questions about whether, and to what extent, the pursuit of national food self-sufficiency within the current policy framework is truly compatible with the agenda underpinning food sovereignty.

5.   Discussion

This discussion explores how the newly proposed French law on ‘food sovereignty’ positions itself vis-à-vis the overarching goals and regulatory constraints of the CAP, with particular attention to (5.1) the evolving semantics of ‘food sovereignty’; (5.2) the exercise of national policy space under EU law; and (5.3) the convergence and tension between the French law’s objectives and those of the CAP.

5.1.  The evolving semantics of ‘food sovereignty’

Originally articulated by peasant movements such as La Via Campesina, the concept of food sovereignty foregrounds democratic control over food systems, the autonomy of small-scale producers, the use of agroecological practices, and the preservation of cultural and agricultural diversity. In contrast, the French law introduces a broader vision of ‘food and agricultural sovereignty’ that merges these grassroots principles with state-centric objectives, including agricultural competitiveness, technological modernisation, and workforce renewal. While certain provisions – such as commitments to fair farmer remuneration, the recognition of women’s contributions in agriculture, and support for short food supply chains – echo elements of the peasant-led food sovereignty agenda, the overall trajectory of the law closely aligns with CAP narratives on productivity, resource efficiency, and generational turnover. Notably, the French law tends to blur the conceptual distinction between food security, which is traditionally oriented around availability, affordability, and trade, and food sovereignty, which emphasises structural justice, local autonomy, and participatory governance. This conceptual conflation raises concerns regarding clarity and normative intent: do the proposed measures genuinely aim to empower local producers and democratise food systems, or do they function primarily as State instruments to preserve France’s market share and agri-food competitiveness under the guise of food sovereignty?

By integrating bottom-up principles within a top-down institutional framework, and focusing on aims which are conflicting with the peasant-led understanding of food sovereignty, the French Orientation law risks diluting the transformative and emancipatory essence of food sovereignty. Rather than serving as a vehicle for systemic change, the concept is recast as a marker of national capacity and resilience, potentially reducing food sovereignty to a strategic policy label serving capitalist interests[137] rather than a substantive shift in power relations and governance structures within food systems.

5.2.  The exercise of national policy space under EU law

With this new agricultural Orientation law, France frames its political ambitions in the agri-food sector around the concept of food sovereignty. At first glance, it could seem ordinary that as an EU Member State, France uses its ability to set out its own agri-food policy at national level. The TFEU provides that the EU and the Member States have a shared competence on agricultural matters,[138] allowing both the EU and Member States to legislate and adopt legally binding acts,[139] although Member States can only use their competence to the extent that the EU has not exercised its competence yet.[140] At the national level, France adopted agricultural Orientation laws as early as 1960,[141] coinciding with the establishment of the European Economic Community, the precursor to the European Union. From this vantage point, France has historically exercised its sovereign authority to determine its own agri-food priorities, even as the EU has progressively shaped EU-wide agri-food policy through successive reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which have in turn influenced France’s political orientation in this domain. However, the adoption of the new Orientation law may also signal a deliberate political intention by French authorities to assert a distinct national stance, thereby delineating their policy from that of the EU.[142]

However, the leeway given to EU Member States, including France, to adopt their own agricultural policies and laws within the EU is particularly constrained. Despite the division of legislative powers between the EU and the Member States in agricultural matters, Member States are bound by a number of obligations laid down in the EU Treaties, including the objectives of the CAP as set forth in Title III of the TFEU,[143] as well as the internal market rules prohibiting quantitative restrictions between Member States.[144] In this context, France’s ambition to enshrine a distinctly national agri-food policy through its Orientation law sits uneasily alongside EU Treaty rules, EU internal market principles and state-aid[145] disciplines. This tension is particularly relevant in the present case, where France explicitly invokes the concept of food sovereignty to shape its national agri-food policy, a concept that the European Commission approaches with considerable scepticism regarding its application at the Member State level.[146]

5.3.  Between alignment and friction: The French law vs. the CAP

While some of the aims enumerated in the French law may appear innovative in relation to the obligations set out in the EU Treaties, they are not novel in relation to the agri-food political aims of the European Commission. For instance, in its latest agri-food policy setting out a ‘Vision for Agriculture and Food’, the Commission acknowledges that ‘farmers in the EU are increasingly concerned by unfair global competition and lack of reciprocity’[147] and the need to elaborate ‘reciprocity measures’ for the livestock sector.[148]While using a similar wording, the French Orientation law calls for ‘ensuring that all free-trade agreements respect the principle of reciprocity and require comparable production conditions for market access’.[149] Similarly, French and European objectives seem to converge regarding the goal of protein autonomy. On one hand, France aims to promote both the EU’s and France’s protein autonomy by setting specific target to achieve such goal,[150] while on the other hand, the Commission acknowledges the EU’s reliance on imports concerning protein supply, and proposes to develop a comprehensive plan to ‘create a more self-sufficient and sustainable EU protein system, while at the same time diversifying imports’.[151] Another instance in which France’s goals converge with the EU’s pertains to organic farming. The Orientation law includes the objective of achieving 21% of organic farming by 1 January 2030, which echoes the EU objective of achieving 25% of the EU’s agricultural land under organic farming by 2030, set out in the European Commission’s ‘Farm to Fork’ strategy in 2020.

From a legal perspective, although the EU’s complex regulatory framework appears to leave limited room for autonomous national agri-food policymaking, the 2023 CAP reform marks a notable departure from this centralised logic. It introduces a more decentralised governance model that enhances Member States’ flexibility in implementing the CAP. In particular, the reform grants Member States increased discretion in the design and execution of national agri-food policies through the development of national plans. Although there is no explicit reference to food sovereignty in the French NSP,[152] the Orientation law appears to capitalise on this flexibility by bolstering the domestic self-sufficiency of certain agricultural products; calling for all free-trade agreements to respect the principle of reciprocity and requiring comparable production conditions for market access; and guaranteeing food security to the national population. 

In particular, a close reading of the French law’s aims reveals substantial overlap with the CAP’s ten specific objectives under the 2023 reform: sustainable productivity, climate-smart agriculture, generational renewal, rural vitality, and food security, among others. Both frameworks share a commitment to ensuring farm viability, improving resilience in the agricultural sector, promoting sustainability, and addressing climate change. The French law’s aim to maintain national food production systems while safeguarding farmers from unfair international competition closely aligns with CAP’s objective to ‘support viable farm income and resilience’.[153] Similarly, the French law’s emphasis on food security echoes the CAP’s commitment to market stability and consumer access.[154] In addition, both the French law and the CAP rules refer to various weak environmental measures promoting biodiversity, carbon reduction, and efficient natural resource use,[155] whose effectiveness is questionable in relation to other economic objectives, such as increasing competitiveness.[156]

Overall, the CAP does not explicitly adopt ‘food sovereignty’ as a policy objective, but it remains indirectly embedded through the principles of subsidiarity and Member State discretion. In contrast, the French law embraces a more explicitly territorially grounded conception of food sovereignty, emphasizing the maintenance and development of national production systems, including processing and distribution sectors. This approach, however, does not entirely depart from the CAP’s market-oriented model. Rather, the French law selectively integrates various aims generally oriented towards market competitiveness while foregrounding domestic food autonomy. Specifically, the French legislation places emphasis on protecting national agriculture from unfair competition by requiring compliance with EU-equivalent standards for imported products, asserting the principle of reciprocity in trade agreements, and advancing strategic self-sufficiency in critical sectors such as protein production, irrigation infrastructure, and livestock farming. This articulation of food sovereignty reflects a more defensive and protectionist orientation toward globalisation, aiming to shield national food systems from the volatility of international markets. 

Where the divergence becomes most pronounced is in the underlying normative framework. The CAP continues to be anchored in a liberalised, competitiveness-driven paradigm that prioritises market efficiency, international trade, and technological innovation. While environmental and social objectives have been increasingly integrated into the CAP’s structure, they remain subordinated to economic priorities and are implemented within a framework that supports large-scale, export-oriented production models. This contrast underscores a broader tension between national strategies aimed at reclaiming policy space in food governance and supranational agricultural regulation grounded in liberal market integration.

6.   Final remarks

While France is the only Member State to have adopted a dedicated Orientation law explicitly centred on ‘food sovereignty’, similar political and regulatory dynamics are emerging elsewhere in the EU and merit systematic study. Spain’s Ley 16/2021,[157] which substantially amended the Ley 12/2013 de la Cadena Alimentaria,[158] aims to protect domestic producers, correct power imbalances along the supply chain, and secure the national food supply, and has been discussed as a step toward a more sovereignty-oriented agri-food model. In Italy, several legislative proposals explicitly invoke this concept. Notably, the bill ‘Coltivaitalia’ seeks to reinforce national agricultural production with an investment of around one billion euro,[159] while the bill on the protection of Italian food products, approved by the Council of Ministers on 9 April 2025, introduces stronger sanctions against food fraud and practices linked to ‘Italian Sounding’.[160] Both initiatives frame domestic production and territorial protection as central goals, echoing the themes present in the French Orientation law.

In this contribution, we highlight that the CAP’s shift toward flexibility was intended to allow better tailoring of interventions to national and local contexts. In theory, this ‘renationalisation’ could create fertile ground for genuine national food sovereignty approaches, which enable measures such as public procurement from local smallholders, legal protection for peasant rights, or community land trusts. In practice, however, the dominance of the internal market objective and state-aid rules places strict limits on policies that might impede cross-border trade or constitute prohibited subsidies. Thus, while the CAP framework allows for national food sovereignty ambitions, it simultaneously constrains them, ensuring that national measures remain bound by common rules on competition and market access. 

As a result, national measures must operate within a tightly regulated legal framework that requires consistency with EU-wide rules on trade, competition, and state aid. The French case illustrates this delicate balance: while the Orientation law signals a political ambition to assert national agri-food sovereignty, its practical implementation will depend on its ability to comply with the binding legal obligations imposed by the EU agri-food legislation. This tension, on the one hand, highlights a broader structural challenge in the EU’s multi-level governance of food systems, namely, how to accommodate increasing demands for the formulation of national agri-food policies within a deeply integrated and market-oriented legal framework. On the other hand, it underscores the need for a renewed dialogue on how flexibility within the CAP can be effectively leveraged to support diverse, context-specific pathways toward sustainable and resilient food systems.

Future research should examine whether these national initiatives amount to functional equivalents of the French approach, how they rely on the post-2023 CAP flexibility, and the extent to which they interact with internal market, competition, and state aid constraints. Such a comparative inquiry would clarify whether France represents an isolated case or the first example of a broader trend in which Member States selectively reinterpret CAP objectives through the politically charged language of food sovereignty. As the CAP continues to evolve, understanding how Member States use this renewed flexibility will be central to assessing whether food sovereignty claims reinforce, reshape, or challenge the direction of EU agri-food governance.